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Abstract

In Multani, the Supreme Court of Canada's kirpan case, judges disagree over the proper approach to reviewing
administrative action under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The concurring judges questioned
the leading judgment, Slaight Communications, on the basis that it is inconsistent with the French text of
section I. This disagreement stimulates reflections on language and culture in Canadian constitutional and
administrative law. A reading of both language versions of section 1, Slaight, and the critical scholarship
'reveals a linguistic dualism in which scholars read one version of the Charter and of the judgment and write
about them in that language. The separate streams undermine the idea of a shared, bilingual public law. Yet the
differences exceed language. The article identifies a legal culture of droit administratif québécois: that is,
administrative law, practiced in French, within Quebec. That civilians working in French within Quebec
approach public law differently than do others troubles the assumption that Canadian public law derives
uniformly from British law.
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PRESCRIBED BY LAW/UNE REGLE
DE DROIT©
ROBERT LECKEY*
In Multani, the Supreme Court of Canada's
kirpan case, judges disagree over the proper
approach to reviewing administrative action under
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The
concurring judges questioned the leading judgment,
Slaight Communications, on the basis that it is
inconsistent with the French text of section I. This
disagreement stimulates reflections on language and
culture in Canadian constitutional and administrative
law. A reading of both language versions of section 1,
SIaight, and the critical scholarship 'reveals a
linguistic dualism in which scholars read one version
of the Charter and of the judgment and write about
them in that language. The separate streams
undermine the idea of a shared, bilingual public law.
Yet the differences exceed language. The article
identifies a legal culture of droit administratif
qudbdcois: that is, administrative law, practiced in
French, within Quebec. That civilians working in
French within Quebec approach public law
differently than do others troubles the assumption
that Canadian public law derives uniformly from
British law.

Dans I'affaire Multanisur le port du kirpan, les
juges de la Cour supr~me.du Canuda exprim~rent
leur d6saccord au sujet de l'approche ad6quate au
contr6le des d6cisions administratives en vertu de la
Charte canadienne des droits et Iibertes. Les juges
minoritaires remirent en question l'arr~t Slaight
Communications, arguant que cc pr6cddent 6tait
incompatible avec la version frangaise de l'article
premier de la Charte. Ce d6saccord soulive des
r~flexions.au sujet du r6le du langage et de la culture
au sein du droit constitutionnel et administratif
canadien. Une lecture des versions anglaise et
frangaise de ['article premier et de Slaight et de la
doctrine revile un dualisme linguistique par lequel
les juristes lisent une seule version de la Charte et du
jugement et les commentent en cette mme langue.
Cette bifurcation des approches remet en cause
l'id6e d'un droit public bilingue et partag6, car les
diff6rences d6passent le seul domaine de la langue.
Cet article identifie une culture juridique de droit
de droit
administratif qu6b6cois, c'est-A-dire
administratif pratiqu6 en franqais au Qu6bec. Le fait
que les civilistes travaillant en frangais au Qu6bec
approchent le droit public d'une mani~re distincte de
celle adopt6e ailleurs au Canada vient mettre en
question Ia th6orie selon laquelle le droit public
canadien est uniform6ment issu du droit britannique.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Canadians outside Quebec might have been bewildered by the
fuss following the Supreme Court of Canada's unanimous decision that
it was impermissible for a Montreal school board to prohibit a Sikh
student from wearing a kirpan. 1 Within the province, Multaniunleashed
a torrent of fierce criticism: here was proof that multiculturalism had
gone too far. In their worst light, the criticisms might be regarded as
assimilationist, majoritarian, racist, or xenophobic prejudice. It annoyed
some pundits that the claimant had left the French-language public
system for an English-language private school. That withdrawal
nourished a sense on the part of some that it was an open question
whether the public school system had rejected Gurbaj Multani or vice
versa. In their best light, the reactions might be understood as defences
of a precarious secularism, however lately achieved. No sooner are the
crucifixes and school prayers banished from the classroom, on this
understanding, than a student seeks religion's return to the public
education system-and in the form of a dangerous weapon at that!
Multani and its reactions raise complex, perhaps uncomfortable
questions about Jidentitdnationale and the boundaries of belonging. If
hostility to the kirpan case within Quebec strikes outside observers as
excessive, it is worth recalling that treatment of religious family
arbitration in Ontario has also exposed substantial anxiety about an
ostensibly secular society's relation to the multicultural other.
Remote from the television talk shows and radio phone-ins,
administrative law scholars working primarily in English outside Quebec
may find the judgment baffling on matters concerning them more

'Multani v. Commission ScolaireMarguerite-Bourgeoys,[2006] 1 S.C.R. 256 [Multamr].
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directly. Why did the consensus on quashing the school board's decision
require three sets of reasons? All nine judges agreed that the board's
council of commissioners decided the matter wrongly. Yet they seem to
have disagreed on much. Why was the case not a straightforward
application of established method? Since Slaight CommunicationsInc. v.
Davidson,2 it has been understood that even where enabling legislation
complies with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,3
administrative decisions made under it-in that judgment, a labour
adjudicator's order-may themselves attract scrutiny for their
constitutional compliance. Where such a decision results in a prima facie
breach of a Charterright, the question arises whether it is justifiable
under section 1. If authorized by statutory authority, the decision is
"prescribed by law"-the phrase in section 1-and might be justifiable as
a reasonable limit. If the decision fails that test, the decision maker has
exceeded its jurisdiction.4
In Multanl Justice Charron, with the support of four colleagues,
purported to follow the approach in Slaight and another judgment, Ross
v. New Brunswick School DistrictNo. 155 She held that the prohibition
against the wearing of a kirpan limited Mister Multani's Charterright to
freedom of religion. Then she tested that limit under section 1. Justice
Charron concluded that it neither impaired Mister Multani's rights
minimally, nor did its salutary effects outweigh its deleterious ones. This
application of those earlier authorities will incite critical comment. It
may disconcert some observers that the majority followed Slaight and
Ross so directly, since both concerned statutory discretions which decision

2 [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038 [Slaight.

' Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [Charte].
" In a nutshell, Slaight concerned a former employer's challenge to two orders made by a
labour adjudicator. The positive order required the employer to write a letter of reference on
certain terms. The negative order prohibited it from saying anything further about the employee.
Both Dickson C.J.C. (Wilson, La Forest, and L'Heureux-Dub JJ. concurring) and Beetz J.,
dissenting, adopted the methodological and theoretical analysis of interest to this article: Lamer J.'s
discussion of the applicability of the Charterto administrative decision-making (supra note 2 at
1048, 1058). As for the challenged orders, the Chief Justice held both orders to limit freedom of
expression contrary to s. 2(b) of the Charter,but justifiably under s. 1. Lamer J. examined both
orders for their reasonableness in the administrative law sense, concluding the negative order to be
patently unreasonable, rendering it unnecessary to consider the Charter.He upheld the positive
order as a reasonable limit on s. 2(b). Beetz J. held both orders to be unjustifiable limits on s. 2(b).
-[1996] 1 S.C.R. 825 [Ross].
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makers needed to exercise consistently with the Charter.In Multarn by
contrast, the challenge did not target a discretionary decision under valid
enabling legislation. It attacked the board's application of its Code de vie,
itself promulgated under delegated authority, which included a rule
against carrying weapons and dangerous objects. Justice Charron is
explicit that "the administrative and constitutional validity of the rule" is
not in issue, only its blunt but textually plausible application.6 On some
views, it should have been the rule that underwent challenge and might
have proven justifiable under section 1. One might also emphasize that
the school board's lawyer had initially reached an accommodation with
the boy's parents, an arrangement that the board and council overruled.
This disregard for local governance, and the Supreme Court's implicit
annoyance with it, prompt suspicions that the case turns on subsidiarityon respect for local solutions in public administration-as much as on
fundamental freedoms. More important for present purposes, however,
are the concurring reasons.
Though agreeing on the outcome, Justices Deschamps and Abella
adopted a different approach for this challenge to administrative action.
The obvious characterization is that this difference is methodological.
Whereas the majority assessed the council's decision for its justification in
limiting a Charterright,they tested its reasonableness under administrative
law doctrines. The basis for their methodological choice, and their
departure from Justice Lamer's tack in Slaight, was their reading of
section 1 of the Charter.As they put it, an administrative body's decision
"cannot be equated with a 'law' within the meaning of s. 1."' In their view,
only norms of general application, not individual administrative decisions,
can undergo direct Charterscrutiny. After their administrative law review
of the board's decision, they declared it invalid as unreasonable.'
Beyond the plain methodological difference, the disagreement
between the majority and concurring judges is also significant in a less
obvious way. Early assessments report that, in disputing the scrutiny of
administrative decisions under section 1, these judges "revisited the old

6

Multanl, supra note 1 at para. 19 [emphasis added].

'Official headnote, ibid.at 260, a starker articulation of para. 112.
'This article will not address it, but LeBel J. concurred separately, tracing a middle ground
between Deschamps and Abella JJ.'s "norm-decision duality" and Charron J.'s rigid application of
the test from R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (ibid.at paras. 150-51).
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debate as to the meaning of the term 'prescribed by law."' 9 Yet is that
quite right? As a puzzled reader may notice, the English version of
section 1 nowhere mentions "a law," the key term for Justices Deschamps
and Abella. It includes only the phrase "prescribed by law." This
disjuncture between what these judges say of the Charterand its text
invites a closer observation of language. Might it matter that all three
opinions were drafted in French, ensuring that the unilingual reader of
English must content herself with a translation? Indeed, Justice Lamer's
reasons in Slaightwere themselves written in French, then translated. The
disconnection vanishes when reading the Charterand the concurrence in
Multani in French. A better view, then, is that the disagreement turns on
language. Justices Deschamps and Abella are not denying that an
administrative decision can be "prescribed by law" within the meaning
of section 1. Rather, they are contending with the majority judges over
the French version of section 1, which specifies that protected rights "ne
peuvent &re restreints que par une r~gle de droit." It is in referring to
the French text of section 1 that they state: "On ne peut assimiler une
d6cision ou ordonnance d'un organisme administratif A une 'r~gle de
droit' au sens de l'article premier"; in other words, an administrative
body's decision "cannot be equated with a 'law' within the meaning of
s. 1." "R~gle de droit" is the complete term from section 1; "law" is not.
What are the layers so far? One level is the methodological
debate about translating the uneasy relation between the Charterand
administrative law into judicial practice. While, nearly twenty years on,
scholars largely acknowledge as constitutional orthodoxy the relevant
propositions of Justice Lamer in Slaight-the Charteis application to
administrative orders, and the possibility of directly testing them-they
do not do so uncritically. The disagreement in Multani will doubtless
stimulate further comment, though contributing to that debate is not
this article's primary ambition. A second level is interpretive and
linguistic. Multani presents francophone judges, writing in French to
decide a Quebec case, disagreeing over the implications for
constitutional and administrative law of the French version of section 1
and the compatibility of Slaight with it. What unites the linguistic and
doctrinal layers, or rather, reveals them as overlapping or connected, is

' David Mullan, "Section 7 and Administrative Law Deference-No Room at the Inn?"
(2006) 34 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 227 at 239; see also Carissima R. Mathen, "Developments in
Constitutional Law: The 2005-2006 Term" (-2006) 35 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 17 at 69.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 45, NO. 3

that doctrinal debate consists largely of separate streams of English and
French scholarship questioning Slaight, often with reference to only one
language version of section 1. This article's chief objective is to explore
this overlap of method and language. It may disappoint some readers
that, beyond emphasizing that both must be read, the article posits no
best interpretation of the two language versions of section 1. Such
prescription falls outside its scope, which calls, instead, for taking
Multanias a point of departure for reflections on language and culture
in Canadian constitutional and administrative law.
The article questions two assumptions in Canadian
constitutional theory. One is that constitutional law assures public law's
bilingualism, at least at the federal level and in several provinces. The
other is that public law in Canada has a uniformly common-law
character, inherited from Great Britain. This challenge to prevailing
suppositions unfolds in three parts. Part II reveals that Slaight and the
scholarship critical of it exemplify a practice of linguistic dualism. In this
practice, jurists read just one language version of the Charterand write
about it in that language. These are not identical debates playing out in
parallel. Instead, the understandings of section 1 and its implications for
administrative action based on the English text, written about in
English, differ from those based on the French, written about in French.
The differences in the texts, judgments, and scholarship in the two
languages ensure that a reading of the English translation of Multani
alone will be an impoverished one. Yet, as Part III argues, the two
language versions of the Charter do not subsist in total isolation.
Reflections on legal bilingualism, as well as close readings of
applications of section 1 in translated judgments, show some judges and
scholars, sometimes, to negotiate both versions. To this point, the
argument appears to turn primarily on language, possibly disturbing
solely the assumption about public law's bilingualism. If discrepancies
between the language versions of the constitution caused the differing
ideas about the relation between the Charterand administrative law,
amending the text might reduce or eliminate the conflict. Crucially,
though, Part IV contends that disputes over language risk obscuring
another, cultural dimension. The presence of a legal culture of droit
administratifqudbdcois, largely practiced in French, undermines the
second assumption, that all Canadian administrative law derives from its
British antecedents. In at least some instances, this legal culture leads its
participants to approach section l's threshold question differently than
do others. A re-reading of the concurrence in Multarn in which the
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civilian idea of la regle de droit is prominent, reveals the influence of
this legal culture. A richer reading of Multarn then, attends not only to
both languages, but also to more than one legal culture. Indeed, the civil
law's influence on scholarly and judicial approaches to a constitutional
matter implies that it is unsatisfactory to confine harmonization
efforts-concerning the interrelation of federal law with provincial
common law and civil law-to private law.
A caveat is in order. The suggestion that Multani might prove
mysterious for administrative law scholars working primarily in English
has implicitly invoked as foil those working chiefly in French. Likely as it
is that many administrative and constitutional law scholars have, in fact,
read Multanionly in its English translation, that contrast risks resurrecting
the creaky, inaccurate, and unproductive dichotomy of English-Canadian
common lawyers and French-Canadian civilians. Such a binary opposition
scants the rich currents of contemporary linguistic and cultural movement
and mdtissage. These currents are evident not only in the practice of law
in English in Montreal and in French in Moncton, but also in the study
and teaching of law where the common law is taught in French and the
civil law and common law are taught together in both languages. Another
contrast is thus critical: Multani reveals internal disagreements between
judges writing in French. Many francophone judges-to the extent the
epithet is useful-have followed Justice Lamer's approach in Slaight.
Thus the legal culture sketched in Part IV does not exert a constant
influence. While it draws attention to separate bodies of legal thought in
English and French, this article also reads Multanias illuminating internal
debates among legal scholars and judges labouring in French, ones that
have passed largely unnoticed in English-language scholarship.
II.

LINGUISTIC DUALISM IN THE WAKE OF SLAIGHT

As known by every law student, if not every child in the school
yard, the Chartees rights are not absolute. In the much-studied words of
section 1, the Charterguarantees its rights and freedoms "subject only
to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society." "Prescribed by law" serves a
"special gate-keeper function."'" On the face of the text, possibly

o Lorraine Eisenstat Weinrib, "The Supreme Court of Canada and Section One of the
Charter"' (1988) 10 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 469 at 472.
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unconstitutional government action that is not "prescribed by law"
cannot be justified by a demonstration that it reasonably limits a right.
Questions arise about what constitutes "law" in this setting and how
precise and explicit a valid prescription must be. Together the verb
prescribeand the noun law hint to some readers that limits on rights, to
pass the threshold, must satisfy both formal and substantive criteria.1" In
any event, judicial accretions have superseded prolonged speculation on
the implications of the bare text.
In the figurative words of two respected constitutional scholars,
judges have construed the "prescribed by law" threshold as having "two
limbs." One is substantive: "the requisite degree of precision or
explicitness that a law must have in order to prescribe the limitation of
Charter rights." The other is formal: "that the limitation be made by
law." Combining the two, "a law of the appropriate form actually
prescribes the limitation in question.""2 The debates of interest to this
article flow from Justice Lamer's explanation in Slaightthat a delegated
decision maker's individual order satisfied this second limb.
The English translation of Justice Lamer's reasons incorporates
the vocabulary of the English constitutional text. The Charter, he
reiterates, guarantees the right "to have such rights and freedoms
subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.""i Since
"prescribed by law" serves as a threshold, pronouncing a limitation to be
"prescribed by law" indicates its full membership in the class of
justifiable limits on rights. Justice Lamer declares that the impugned
order is prescribed by law and can therefore be justified under section 1.
Despite the firmness of this assertion, the explanation for why the
adjudicator's order constitutes a limit prescribed by law strikes some
commentators as fragile. Frankly, Justice Lamer risks undercutting his
own plain statement by writing shortly afterwards that it is "the
legislative provision conferring discretion which limits the right or

n Compare the early view that "law" targets only the "source of the power, not the manner
of its exercise." Neil Finkelstein, "Section 1: The Standard for Assessing Restrictive Government
Actions and the CharteisCode of Procedure and Evidence" (1983) 9 Queen's L.J. 143 at 161.
12 Sujit Choudhry & Kent Roach, "Racial and Ethnic Profiling: Statutory Discretion,
Constitutional Remedies, and Democratic Accountability" (2003) 41 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1 at 8
[footnote omitted; emphasis in original].
' Slaight,supra note 2 at 1079.
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freedom, since it is what authorizes the holder of such discretion to
make an order."14 If the legislative provision limits the right, must it not
be justified under section 1? However shaky the justification, the
English translation affirms that the adjudicator's order falls squarely
within the class of rights limitations contemplated by section 1. Justice
Lamer appears to demarcate the boundaries of a single set of legal
artifacts that satisfy "prescribed by law." Within that set, there are no
first- and second-class members. If rights limitations imposed by primary
and secondary legislation will be prescribed by law, so too can be those
imposed by the administrative decisions they enable. 5
If a limitation on a right resulting from an administrative
decision or a more general enactment fails the test under section 1, that
decision or enactment infringes the Charterand a constitutional remedy
may be appropriate. Two explicit remedial provisions in the constitution
function as alternatives. Some find it helpful to think of "two different
tracks" which depend on the constitutional violation's source. Where a
law of general application-a statute, a regulation, or a common law
rule-is inconsistent with the Charter,Track 1 is the route and section
52 provides that the law is invalid to the extent of that inconsistency. For
individualized acts that violate Charterrights,Track 2 leads to the range
of remedies available under section 24.16
The focus in Slaighton the Chartercompliance of administrative
orders, policed by individual remedies under section 24, likely satisfies
those concerned with maintaining administrative efficacy while guarding
against individual abuses of power. A number of scholars commented
favourably on the treatment of the adjudicator's order as a reasonable
limit on a Charter right. The most extensive discussion of Slaight
published in English assesses the application of constitutional standards
directly to the discretionary decision as protecting rights adequately.
Requiring more explicit legislative standards would yield "no significant
benefits" and might detrimentally reduce an adjudicator's flexibility to

Ibid.at 1080-81.

14

5

' Effectively, the Court often equates "prescribed by law" with "authorized by law": e.g.Eaton v.
Brant County Board of Education,[1997] 1 S.C.R. 241 at para. 3; Slaigh ibid Dictionary meanings of
"authorize" and "prescribe" are similar but not identical. The latter connotes a more stringent sense of
constraint: "Limit, restrict; confine within bounds" and "Lay down rules." Lesley Brown, ed., The New
Shorter Oxford EnglishDictionary,2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), s.v."authorize," "prescribe."
6

Choudhry & Roach, supra note- 12 at 3-4.
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respond to individual cases. 7 On other positive assessments, Slaight
shows appropriate recognition of the actual operation of administrative
tribunals, particularly labour boards. 8
Yet Slaight's holding that an administrative decision is "prescribed
by law" and thus justifiable under section 1 has stimulated a number of
criticisms. Coupled with the presumption that enabling legislation is
constitutionally compliant, it insulates enabling legislation and spotlights
individual decisions. Reliance on individual remedies under section 24 is
uncontroversial when an officer operates egregiously. But the situation
differs where Charter violations occur routinely. Persistent Charter
violations in the implementation of a statute generate suspicions that the
statute is itself to blame. Invalidating individual administrative actions,
while maintaining the constitutional validity of the enabling statute, can
appear unsatisfactory. The example parexcellence is an ongoing sequence
of litigation in which a gay bookstore has challenged the repeated
discriminatory administration of obscenity measures. In Little Sisters Book
andArt Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice),9 the majority of the
Supreme Court concluded that, despite the dismal experience of
implementation, the customs officers could, in theory, apply the customs
legislation consistently with the Charter.Three dissenting judges opined
that the extensive record of unconstitutional application made it imperative
for the legislation to provide measures to ensure respect for Charterrights
in its administration. Some proposals for reform reflect dissatisfaction with
this judgment and with the general analytical approach taken from Slaight.
One proposal objects to the practice of seeking the justification of
rights-limiting administrative action case by case. It argues that the
justification should be pitched at the enabling norm. Sujit Choudhry and
Kent Roach contend that, at least sometimes, rights limitations in the course
of administration will require Charterscrutiny of the enabling legislation.
They take as jurisprudential starting point R. v Therens,2 an early Charter

"June M. Ross, "Applying the ChartertoDiscretionary Authority" (1991) 29 Alta. L. Rev.
382 at 417 [Ross, "Discretionary Authority"].
8

A. Wayne MacKay & Dianne Pothier, "Developments in Constitutional Law: The 198889 Term" (1990) 1 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 81 at 139; Patrick Macklem, "Developments in
Employment Law: The 1988-89 Term" (1990) 1 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 405 at 407.
-9 [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120 [Little Sisters]. For the latest development, see Little Sisters Book
andArt Emporium v. Canada(Commissionerof Customs andRevenue), [2007] 1 S.C.R. 38.
2[1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 [Therens].
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judgment concerning police action in relation to section 1. Writing shortly
after September 11, they warn that national security measures are rife with
the propensity for racial profiling. They propose that where profiling and
other activities obviously endanger Charterrights, courts should require an
explicit or necessarily implicit warrant for exercises of statutory discretion
that limit Charter rights. In other words, legislatures intending their
delegates to systematically limit Charter rights should stipulate that
intention. Where an explicitly stated intention is not justifiable, the enabling
legislation would be invalid under subsection 52(1). Such an approach
would, in their view, significantly increase democratic accountability.21
While Choudhry and Roach's proposal concerns the justification of
a general norm rather than that of an individual action, another bears on
the relative weight of the norms that can be directly scrutinized under the
Charterand perhaps justified as reasonable limits on rights under section 1.
Lorne Sossin would enlarge the category of reviewable administrative
instruments. He argues that soft law-the internal guidelines and manuals
instructing bureaucrats on how to exercise statutory discretion-should in
some circumstances be scrutinized for their Charterconsistency.22 Whereas
Choudhry and Roach argue that unconstitutional administration reeks of a
rotten statute, Sossin suggests that, likelier than not, the source of a Charter
breach lies in departmental policies, guidelines, or manuals. 23 For
taxonomic purposes, internal administrative rules are normative insofar as
they are general and they direct conduct, but they are not "proprement
juridiques." 24 They are not obligatory, nor are they published and made
accessible following the procedures applicable to statutory instruments. 5
Moreover, they are subject to informal amendment and replacement.
What matters for present purposes is not the respective merits of
these proposals, but the kinds of argument they deploy. Both proposals call
on pragmatic arguments.26 They flow from the consequences of the

2) Choudhry & Roach, supranote 12 at 5-6, 33.
22 Lorne Sossin, "Discretion Unbound: Reconciling the Charterand Soft Law" (2002) 45

Can. Pub. Admin. 465 at 481, 467-68.
2Ibid.

at 474.

24 France Houle, Les regles administrativeset I

droitpublic: aux confins de la rgulation

juridique(Cowansville, Qc.: Yvon Blais, 2001) at 13.
25Raoul P. Barbe, La rdglementation(Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur, 1983) at 37-38, c. 3.
25 Chaim Perelman & Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, Trait6 de I'argumentation:La nouvelle
rh6torique,5th ed. (Brussels: Editions de l'Universit6 de Bruxelles, 1988) at 358.
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approach in Slaight,arising in some measure from dissatisfaction with Little
Sisters. Sossin's argument reveals a particularly pragmatic sensitivity to
public administrative practices. Choudhry and Roach also engage in more
conventional doctrinal argument, anchoring their proposal to Therens and
other judgments predating Slaight. Other critiques of Slaighttargeting the
relation between administrative and constitutional law also deploy doctrinal
argument. Important questions about the respective roles of
reasonableness review in administrative law and reasonable justification
under section 1 await resolution. A decade after Slaight, explicit inclusion
of Charter"principles" among the constraints on the exercise of discretion
in Baker v. Canada (M'nister of Employment and Immigration)27 further
undermined the firm distinction in Slaight and Ross between Charter
values and administrative law. 8 Justices Deschamps and Abella's
suggestion in Multani that an administrative law analysis incorporates
Charterarguments resonates with some of the scholarly criticisms.29 As an
argumentative strategy, their effort to reconcile the doctrinal implications
of different Supreme Court judgments-Slaight and Baker, among
others-is consistent with Choudhry and Roach's attempt to resuscitate
Therens and hold it up to Slaight.In contrast, the chief reason that Justices
Deschamps and Abella advance for rejecting Slaight's determination that
administrative decisions might be justifiable rights limitations under section
1 exemplifies an entirely different persuasive form. It is a "quasi logique" or
conceptual argument, relying on the use of definitions." Their contention
turns on the text of the CharteisFrench version.
The French version of section 1 states that the Charter
guarantees its rights and freedoms, which "ne peuvent 6tre restreints
que par une r~gle de droit, dans des limites qui soient raisonnables et
dont la justification puisse se d~montrer dans le cadre d'une socit6
libre et d6mocratique." To be justifiable, such an instrument must be
"une r~gle de droit." "Une r~gle de droit" is a formalrequirement, 3 and
27[1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 at para. 56 [Bakej.
28

Genevieve Cartier, "The Baker Effect: A New Interface between the CanadianCharter
of Rights and Freedoms and Administrative Law-The Case of Discretion" in David Dyzenhaus,
ed., The Unity ofPubicLaw(Oxford:Hart Publishing, 2004) 61.
29
Multani,supra note 1 at para. 86.
3

Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, supra note 26 at 282.

"' Pierre Giroux, St phane Rochette & Stfphane Rousseau, "L'impact de I'article 7 de la
Charte canadienne en droit administratif" in Barreau du Qu6bec, Dodveloppements r6cents en droit
administratif(1994)(Cowansville, Qc.: Yvon Blais, 1994)87 at 119.
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thus a reader of the French is likely to turn to formal classifications of
the legal instrument restraining a protected right. At first blush, this
formal requirement provides meager support for any substantive
requirement of reasonable precision. Yet, understood purposefully, with
a view to advancing the rule of law, "une rbgle de droit" may imply a
measure of precision and accessibility.32 How does Justice Lamer treat
this text in the original French of his reasons in Slaight?
A close reading of Justice Lamer's original French reasons
beside their English translation provides cause for unease. Aided by a
jurilinguist, he makes parallel but distinct arguments. While his English
translation incorporates the vocabulary of the English version of section
1, the original French incorporates the words of the French
constitutional text. The Charter,he states, does not guarantee rights
absolutely; rather, it guarantees the right "de ne pas voir ces droits ou
ces libert6s restreints autrement que par une r~gle de droit."33 Applying
the French text, Justice Lamer writes that the arbitrator's restriction on
a Charterright "provient ...
d'une r~gle de droit"; it comes from "une
r~gle de droit." The introduction of provenirensures that, for a limit to
be justifiable, its being "une r~gle de droit" is no longer necessary.
While literalism is not the lodestar in constitutional interpretation, the
French text provides a basis for at least arguing that limits on rights
must actually be "r~gles de droit," and not merely derive from them. It
is thus unsurprising that support would later resurge for a restrictive
approach by which only "r~gles de droit" would satisfy the test of section
1. Unlike Justice Lamer's reasons translated into English, the original
opinion in French appears to produce two distinct classes of justifiable
rights limits: those that are"r~gles de droit," and those that come from one.
That the argument in each language coheres solely with its language
version of the Charteris not an isolated phenomenon. It exemplifies what
has been called the "practice of two legal unilingualisms."34 Contrary to the
loftier ambitions for legal bilingualism, the parallel arguments in Slaight
show contentment "merely with producing legal artifacts in two languages,"
each of which can be produced and used in isolation from the other.3 5
32

Danielle Pinard, "Les seules r~gles de droit qui peuvent poser des limites aux droits et

libert~s constitutionnellement prot6g~s et l'arr~t Slaight Communications" (1991) 1 N.J.C.L. 79 at 121.
Slaight, supra note 2 at 1079.
-4
3

-

Roderick A. Macdonald, "Legal Bilingualism" (1997) 42 McGill L.J. 119 at para. 42.
Ibid.at para. 6.
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Rather than reading both versions of section 1 together, Justice Lamer
appears indifferent to discrepancies between the two authoritative texts.
He does not point to them, or make an explicit effort to adumbrate the
shared meaning to which both may be thought to refer. Do he and his
translators write, as it were, for isolated English and French audiences,
each reading a single version of the judgment and of the Chartep.If in
Quebec French and English versions of private law enactments do more
than live side-by-side-they speak to each other, in one scholar's felicitous
expression6-the same does not appear consistently true of the two
official renderings of the Charteis first provision.37 Failing to examine
both language versions may create a "constitutional jurisprudence with a
unilingual foundation for a bilingual Constitution."38 By framing separate
arguments in each language, for each language version, rather than
grappling with differences and formulating an argument to reconcile both
authoritative versions, Justice Lamer's reasons in Slaight and their
translation set the scene for distinct streams of scholarship, bequeathing
to the future the dispute in Multani
Predictably, even at the time, the approach in Slaight provoked
stringent criticisms from readers of the French version of section 1.
Danielle Pinard writes that the Court evacuated the express condition
that limits on rights be imposed only "par une r~gle de droit."39 In other
words, the formal requirement in the French text makes it difficult to
accept the theory that seems to have characterized the adjudicator's order
in Slaightas prescribed by law. The notion in that judgment appears to be
that prescription or authorization by law flows down from an enabling
statute so as to permit the characterization of administrative action taken
under that statute as equally prescribed by law. Serge Gaudet
characterizes Slaight as "assez 6tonnant" for contradicting the notion of
"une r~gle de droit" and the spirit of Oakes.4° He observes that the flowdown theory applies much more readily to the English than to the French
' 6 Nicholas Kasirer, "Dire ou d6finir ledroit?" (1994) 28 R.J.T. 141 at 161.
"?For another instance of linguistic dualism in administrative law, recall the differing
interpretations arising from the respective language versions of former s. 28 of the FederalCourtAct,
R.S.C. 1970 (2d Supp.), c. 10. See also Macdonald, "Legal Bilingualism," supranote 34 at 159 n. 153.
38

J.P. McEvoy, "The Charteras a Bilingual Instrument" (1986) 64 Can. Bar Rev. 155 at 159.
Pinard, supra note 32 at 116.

39

'Serge Gaudet, "La r~gle de droit au sens de l'article premier de laCharte canadienne des
droits et libert6s: commentaires sur l'affaire Slaigbt Communications Inc. c. Davidson [1989] 1
R.C.S. 1038" (1990) 20 R.D.U.S. 447 at 468.
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text of the Charter.He writes: "En effet, de toute prescription qui tire sa
force et sa 16gitimit6 du syst~me 16gal, l'on peut aisement dire qu'elle est
'prescribed by law."' 4 By contrast, with an eye on the formal criterion in
the French text, the arbitrator's exercising statutory powers does not
imply "que les actes qu'il pose sont des r~gles de droit au sens de l'article
premier."4 Instead of attending to the qualities expected of "une r~gle de
droit," the majority in Slaight narrows its concern to the legislative source
of the order.4 3 Limiting attention in that way reflects a preference for
what Gaudet identifies as the legalistoption, preoccupied with the source
of power, as opposed to the formalist option, concerned with the manner
of its exercise. He notes disapprovingly that the legalist option, adopted
by the Court, is by far the least demanding.44
45
While time's passage often calms the criticisms of judgments,
objections to Slaight grounded on the French version of section 1
persist. The dubiety of subjecting administrative orders to the Qakes test
remains somewhat a live issue in Quebec scholarship. At least, the
leading Quebec constitutional law text-presumably the introduction
for law students in the province and the practitioner's first referencecontinues to doubt that holding. Thirteen years after the judgment,
Henri Brun and Guy Tremblay still declare it "surprenant" that a
tribunal's decision can be "une r~gle de droit au sens de l'article 1. " 46
The richness of the critiques of Slaightspringing from the French
text underscores the missed opportunity for contact between scholars
working in the two languages. Often, scholars publishing in English situate
their arguments primarily in relation to other scholarship in that language.
Consequently, commentators writing critically of Slaight in English may
understate the extent to which that authority has been questioned. 47 To

41Ibid. at 458 n. 18. [Trans.] "In effect, we can easily say of any prescription that draws its
force and legitimacy from the legal system that it is 'prescribed by law."'
42
Pinard, supra note 32 at 117.
43

Ibid.at 133-34.

4Gaudet, supra note 40 at 468.
"1 Paul W. Kahn, The Cultural Study of Law: ReconstructingLegal Scholarship(Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1999) at 117-18.
46 Henri Brun & Guy Tremblay, Droit constitutionnel,4th ed. (Cowansville, Qc.: Yvon Blais,
2002) at 945. By contrast, Lamer J. approves the analysis in Hogg's leading English-language monograph
(Slaighb4 supra note 2 at 1078-79), something noted with understandable satisfaction in subsequent editions.
4
Sossin, supra note 22 at 479 n. 57, cites only Choudhry and Roach for scholarly challenges
to the approach in Slaight.In highlighting the role of soft law in Charterbreaches, he is less alone than
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give one example of a missed opportunity for scholarly exchange,
Choudhry and Roach's proposal, grounded theoretically on democratic
accountability and the separation of powers, prescribes the same outcome
as conceptual arguments anchored to the French phrase "une r~gle de
droit." Yet those scholars, working in English, appear not to have armed
themselves with the hints emerging from the French version of the
Charter and the related literature generated in Quebec.4 8 Since the
critical scholarship in French is not just a different version of the same
arguments, scholars working in English, by consulting only English
materials, deprive themselves of access to additional normative
resources. Of course, no scholar can achieve exhaustiveness, nor would a
reader tolerate the footnotes if one tried. The interest of the observation
lies not in the omission to cite published scholarship per se, but in the
suspicion it raises that English-language administrative and
constitutional law scholars do not attend to French-language debates on
what is, in theory, a common constitution and public law. Do virtual
boundaries confine the English-language scholarship critical of Slaight?
Might it not reflect what an eminent Quebec judge identified
tendentiously thirty years ago as "an actual separation in legal Canada"?4 9
At times scholarship in French demonstrates a similar insularity, though
generally one of a lesser order.50
Yet it would be misleading to read Slaighfs dominant message
regarding linguistic practices as one of isolation. If attention to
administrative law, international law, and constitutional law shows the

his endnotes imply. For another argument that the customs officers' manuals caused the rights
violation in Little Sisters see Daniel Mockle, "Gouverner sans le droit? Mutation des normes et
nouveaux modes de regulation" (2002) 43 C. de D. 143 at 150 n. 23 [Mockle, "Gouverner"].
' In linking a strict threshold requirement in s. 1 with democratic accountability, Choudhry
and Roach, supra note 12, do not cite Pinard's argument for democratic accountability (supra note
32 at 104-105). They cite at 14 n. 52 an argument predating Slaightthat "prescribed by law" should
refer only to output of the state's "democratic law-making machinery" (Weinrib, supra note 10 at
477), but that earlier piece is silent on the French text's clues in this regard.
'Jules Desch~nes, "On Legal Separatism in Canada" (1978) 12 Law Society Gazette 1 at 2.
For recent evidence of scholarly separation on geographical and linguistic bases, see Marie-Claude
Pr6mont, Book Review of Access to Care--Access to Justice. The Legal Debate over PrivateHealth
InsuranceinCanadaed. by C.M. F16od, K Roach & L. Sossin (2006) 21 Can. J. L. & Soc'y 201.
o Compare the rich cross-over effect when a professor at Universit6 de Sherbrooke
discusses French and English scholarship on the relationship between the Charter and
administrative law: Genevi~ve Cartier, "Administrative Law: Twenty Years after the Chartet"
(2003) 62-63 R. du B. 197 (special issue).
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judgment to enact what one scholar has colourfully called a "messy
m6nage t trois,"' Slaight and its successor judgments also perform a
messy pas de deux in which French and English versions of the Charter
interact. Disputes over the meaning of section 1 might fruitfully be
understood as a synecdoche for the larger relationship between public
law practiced in English and in French, one in which dualism is not the
sole phenomenon observable. Brief exploration of the practice of legal
bilingualism-as a theoretical matter, relating to enactments and
judgments-will prepare the ground for examining the treatment of
section 1 in judges' reasons.
III.

NEGOTIATING LANGUAGE VERSIONS

The English and French versions of the constitution are "equally
authoritative."52 Where there are two authoritative versions, both must
be read. Reliance on a single version, it has been said, is "dangerous for
the citizen and totally unacceptable for any official interpreter."5 3 After
all, reading both and undertaking a preliminary interpretation is the
only way to determine whether the two are sufficiently similar that
reliance on one is permissible. Commentators are, however, conscious
of the tension between the idea that official bilingualism allows
unilingual citizens to function in one official language and the
imperative, dictated by the authoritativeness of both versions, of reading
both.5 4 What does a sensitive reading of both versions entail?
A starting point may be attention to the choices made in drafting
section 1. Strong as the case for a strictly formal reading of "une r~gle
de droit" may appear on the face of the text, the non-dit of the drafters'
exclusions may also contribute to the constitutional meaning. The
drafters seem to have rejected available options that would have

s'Audrey Macklin, "The State of Law's Borders and the Law of States' Borders" in
Dyzenhaus, supra note 28, 173 at 186.
52 Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 3, s. 57. This provision is consistent with the
constitutional regime of bilingualism: Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, s. 133,
reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5; Charter,supra note 3, ss. 16-20. See generally Robert
Leckey & Andr6 Braen, "Bilingualism and Legislation" in Michel Bastarache, ed., LanguageRights
in Canada, 2d ed. (Cowansville, Qc.: Yvon Blais, 2004) 37.
1 Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan and Driedger on the Constructionof Statutes,4th ed. (Markham,
Ont.: Butterworths, 2002) at 77.
5
4Ibid.
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narrowed the scope of the English threshold requirement or enlarged
that of the French. Scholars occasionally lament that English has a
single word "law," while juridically richer languages boast ius-lex, droitIoi*derecho-ley, Recht-Gesetz, and diritto-legge.One should, however,
avoid exaggerating the poverty of English for distinguishing individual
posited laws from law tout court. Had they wished, the drafters of the
Charterknew how to restrict their reference in English to enacted laws
and regulations, along the lines discerned by many readers of the French
text." The French language, for that matter, has its own pitfalls. While
the jurist working in English does not risk confusing law and right,
French uses droit for both droit objectif (rules of conduct regulating
human behaviour) and droits subjectifs (legal rights or prerogatives of
individuals or groups).5 6 The upshot is that while the English version of
section 1 contrasts "rights and freedoms" (droits subjectifs) with limits
"prescribed by law" (droit objectif), the French version uses droit
differently in the same sentence. Nonetheless, establishing the intended
usage is possible. Moreover, the drafters could have referred to legal
authorization in French without fixating on form.57 Intriguing as they
may be, the drafters' choices appear not to point in a single direction,
directing attention to the rules for construing bilingual texts.
The shared meaning rule has long been thought the basic rule
governing interpretation of bilingual enactments. 5' Applying it to section
1, if "prescribed by law" is a wide term, and "une r~gle de droit" a
narrower one contained within it, the narrower idea-the common
content-should prevail, barring other factors.5 9 Today, the shared

' The classic definition of ownership in Quebec's 1866 Civil Code carves away from the owner's
absolute power any use "prohibited by law or by regulations" ("prohib6 par les lois ou les r~glements,"
art. 406 C.C.L.C.). The disjunction of law and regulation unambiguously restricts "law" to statutes. For
the suggestion that "r~gle de droit" is less narrow than some readers of the French suppose, including the
common law whereas "lois" would not have, see Alain Gautron, "French/English Discrepancies in the
CanadianCharterofRghts andFreedom' (1982) 12 Man. L.J. 220 at 222.
56 See discussion of Das subjektive Recht in English law in F.H. Lawson, Many Laws.Selected Essays, vol. 1 (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing, 1977) at 176ff.; Geoffrey Samuel,
"'Le Droit subjectif and English Law" (1987) 46 Cambridge L.J. 264.
' See e.g. the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, 4 November 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 at 223, art. 5(1), which contemplates limits on
certain rights "selon les voies lgales" ("prescribed by law"), a requirement less formally evocative
than "une r~gle de droit."
58

Pierre-Andr6 Ct, !nterprdtationdes lois, 3d ed. (Montreal: Th~mis, 1999) at 412-15.

59

Gaudet, supra note 40 at 469; Pinard, supra note 32 at 102 n. 64.

20071

Prescribedby La w/Une r~gle de droit

meaning rule's weight has become controversial. On some accounts, it
no longer provides the presumptive meaning,6" being simply one factor
among others.6 Yet the shared meaning rule may prove problematic for
reasons beyond the controversy surrounding its normative weight. Its
evocation of a Venn diagram of crisp overlapping circles proves
unsubtle in practice. Contrary to such graphic precision, two versions
"may point to a norm only imperfectly rendered in each."6 And indeed,
the legislative language is an access point for "apprehending, constructing
and translating a legal norm," but it is never the actual norm.63
Scholarly discussions of the threshold requirement in section 1
model differing appreciations of the distinction between a norm and its
textual expression. In their association of the threshold's formal and
substantive "limbs" with the words of the English phrase "prescribed by
law," Choudhry and Roach risk appearing to understand the English
constitutional text as itself the rule, not one non-exhaustive verbal
representation of it.' As the same requirements apply to parties pleading
the French text, it is problematic to understand the requirements
primarily as judicial glosses on "prescribed" and "law." Compare a
Quebec constitutional text's summary of the judicial interpretations:
"Une r~gle de droit, au sens de l'article 1, est une 'norme juridique
intelligible."' Associating the requirements identified by judges with this
reformulation, rather than with the words of the French version, Brun
and Tremblay announce that the idea of "norme juridique" accounts for
the formal requirements, and "intelligible," the substantive. While this
presentation avoids confusing the norm with its verbal expression, it does
not consider possible contributions by the norm's expression in English.
Likely it is preferable to understand the threshold requirement in section

6 Pierre-Andr6 C6t, "Bilingual Interpretation of Enactments in Canada: Principles v. Practice"
(2004) 29 Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 1067 at 1070. Compare Paul Salembier, "Rethinking the Interpretation of
Bilingual Legislation: The Demise of the Shared Meaning Rule" (2003) 35 Ottawa L. Rev. 75.
6 Assuming a divergence between English and French 'articulations of the threshold
requirement in s. 1, the provision's derogation from the protection of rights and freedoms might
militate for the narrower meaning of the two: Pinard, supra note 32 at 102 n. 64.
62
Macdonald, "Legal Bilingualism," supra note 34 at para. 34.
6Ibid.at para. 48.

in Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of
'a See also discussion of "prescribed by law"
Canada, loose-leaf ed., vol. 2 (Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 1992) at 35-11 to 35-13.
65 Brun & Tremblay, supra note 46 at 944-45. [Trans.] "A legal rule, in the sense of s. 1, is
an 'intelligible juridical norm."'
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1 as derived jointly from "prescribed by law" and"une r~gle de droit," or
better yet, from the idea to which those two texts (imperfectly) gesture.
Two critiques of Slaight published in French reveal a richer
understanding of the judicial enterprise as necessarily responsive to both
language versions of the Charter. Suppositions about judicial and
scholarly methodology are detectable in the observation that the Court's
conclusions regarding the legal status of the adjudicator's order in that
judgment perhaps cohere better with the English text of section 1.66 In
Pinard's view, Slaight is not the sole judgment that seems to
accommodate the English version of section 1 better than it does the
French. The conclusions-in the French original of Slaight and in the
French translations of Cotroni and Ladouceur-that, because the
challenged action draws its validity or flows from a statutory provision, it
is therefore "une r~gle de droit" echo arguments made more soundly in
English about those actions being therefore "prescribed by law."67
Pinard assumes, as a matter of judicial methodology, that the judges-at
least Justice Lamer, writing Slaight in French, if not Justices La Forest
and Cory, drafting Cotroni and Ladouceur in English-read and
responded to both language versions, however much, in her view, they
ultimately inclined towards one. The criticism models her scholarly
methodology. Pinard can only assess a judge's evenhandedness towards
the language versions of the Charterby reading the reasons with an eye
on both. These are promising signs, though an approach based on a
single language version has perhaps given way to a sense of the two
versions as competing. They do not yet stand together such that each
illuminates the other. The presumption persists that it is possible to read
and understand the two language versions separately, rather than to
seek out the meaning that emerges when reading each by the other's
light. (The shared meaning rule presumes, similarly, that the two
versions are first interpreted separately and only subsequently
compared.) To speak of Justice Lamer as privileging the English version
over the French is not yet to consider whether the meaning of the
French version is contingent on that of the English, and vice versa. Still,

'Pinard, supra note 32 at 119 n. 115; see also Gaudet's criticism reproduced above in text
accompanying note 41.
6
Ibid. at 120 n. 115, citing UnitedStates of America v. Cotroni" United States of America
v. EIZei, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1469 [Cotroni]; R. v. Ladouceur, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1257 [Ladouceut].
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Pinard and Gaudet avail themselves of a kind of argument foreclosed to
one who reads the judgments against a single version of the constitution.
When a judge quotes the version of a bilingual enactment
corresponding to the language in which she is writing, should the
translation of that judgment systematically quote the corresponding
version of the destination language? A Canadian scholar. has submitted a
strong negative answer, arguing that it is misleading to replace quotations
from one language version of the Charterwithquotations from the other
if the judge did not consider the second language version.6 8 In contrast,
European jurilinguist Martin Weston affirms that "obviously" such
quotations must be reproduced "exactly from the other language
version." He acknowledges that the two versions do not always
correspond as closely as they might, a phenomenon that "sometimes
makes the quotation of isolated words and phrases difficult., 69 Yet he
does not canvass situations where, as in Slaight and Multarn the legal
reasoning in the original language of judgment bears especially on a word
or words that simply have no equivalent in the other language version of
the enactment. The best answer is likely that the judge, in the original
set of reasons and the translation, should quote both language versions
of the enactment. A related question concerns judicial discussion that
adopts statutory or constitutional vocabulary. When translating English
reasons that employ the language of the English version of the Charter,
without quotation marks, should the translator replace those words from
the English constitutional text with the corresponding words from the
French version, or translate the judge's words afresh?
While much has been written about bilingual enactments, rather
less has been written about judgments published in two languages; their
status appears murkier. Unlike statutes and regulations, judgments of
federal courts frequently indicate which version is the original and which
a translation. If it is an uphill battle convincing judges and lawyers to
read both authoritative versions of a statute, few jurists-pressed for
time, the client's docket running-are likely to peruse both versions of a
judgment."0 Scholars writing in English typically read-certainly they

'McEvoy,

supra note 38 at 64.

69 Martin Weston, "Characteristics and Constraints of Producing Bilingual Judgments: The

Example of the European Court of Human Rights" in Jean-Claude G~mar & Nicholas Kasirer,
eds., Jurilinguistics:Between Law and Language (Montreal: Thmis, 2005) 445 at 458.
' On inconsistent language versions of judgments, see Leckey & BraEn, supranote 52 at 128-35.
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quote-all three opinions in Slaight in that language. They appear
indifferent, at a minimum, to the fact that, while Chief Justice Dickson
and Justice Beetz drafted their respective reasons in English, Justice
Lamer wrote in French. Scholars writing in French typically quote all
three sets of reasons in that language. While the official federal
reporters dutifully publish judgments in parallel columns of French and
English, those judgments are today read less in the bound volumes in
law libraries than onscreen-as are statutes-where none of the online
options presents the two language versions side by side.7
Ultimately the better view may be that the text is "incomplete
without both," there being just "one authoritative bilingual text in
French and English."72 Or maybe the juridical truth, so far as one exists,
locates itself in the white space between the parallel columns of French
and English versions where they are so printed.73 Whatever the optimal
theory and method, the translation of judgments can collude in the
practice of legal dualism, producing and sustaining parallel streams of
thought and language based on the different language versions of
bilingual enactments. At times, however, its effect is rather different.
The translation of judgments can complicate the idea of linguistic
dualism. Judicial interpretations of the threshold requirement may, in
part through translation, impose the meaning of one language version
on the other. This occurs when a justification made in one language, on
the basis of that version of section 1, is exported via translation to the
other language in which the constitutional text does not support it-a
transgressive practice illustrated by close readings of Slaight and
Multan; among other judgments.
Given the earlier observation that the English idea of a limit
"prescribed" or "authorized by law" best coheres with the notion that legal
authorization flows down from a discretion-conferring statute, it is
interesting that judges and legal translators seem to have adopted the
English text of section 1 as ostensibly more authoritative than the French.

7 The Supreme Court of Canada now insists that counsel provide relevant legislative
provisions in both official languages where they are required by law to be so published, but the
Court does not prompt the inclusion of both language versions of judgments. Rules of the Supreme
Courtof Canada,r. 4 2(2)(g), 44(2)(b), 44(3)-(4).
' Macdonald, "Legal Bilingualism," supra note 34 at paras. 25, 48.
Nicholas Kasirer, "L'outre-loi" in Lynne Castonguay & Nicholas Kasirer, eds., Etudieret
enseigner le droit: bier, aujourd'hui et demain. Eftudes offertes h Jacques Vanderlinden
(Cowansville, Qc.: Yvon Blais, 2006) 329 at 339-40.
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They have imported "prescribe" into French discussions of section 1.
Introduction of the verb prescrireinto French analysis draws the French
text closer to the English syntax. In Therens, Justice Le Dain writes in
English of the "requirement that the limit be prescribed by law." The point
is translated as "L'exigence que la restriction soit prescritepar une r~gle
de droit."74 A verb that distances the authorizing legal rule from the rights
limit-emphasizing the limit's source at the expense of its form-has
infiltrated discussion in French of section 1. A similar distance is detectable
when a limit "prescribed by law" is translated as one "pr6vue par une
r~gle de droit."75 In other words, it is no longer necessary that "une rigle
de droit" be the instrument which limits a right. It suffices that "une r~gle
de droit" prescribe or foresee that something else will impose a limit.
If this addition is an occasional occurrence, its effects should not
be exaggerated. If it repeats often enough, suspicions may arise that the
judges are saying things in English about section 1 that they cannot
convincingly express using the resources of the French version. In such a
case, a tacit act of constitutional amendment might have occurred. One
would likely be hard pressed, for example, to express in French, using
the lexicon of the French version of the Charter,this scholarly summary
of Slaight: "that order is prescribed by law because the underlying
statutory provision is prescribed by law."76 That an order is issued in
virtue of an authorizing "r~gle de droit" does not make that order itself
formally "une r~gle de droit." What do the law reports show?
While the French constitutional text speaks of rights limited only
"par une r~gle de droit," judgments in French translation refer regularly
to rights limitations "prescritespar une r~gle de droit."77 The slippage
might indicate how at least some judges think about section L" Yet the
' Therens, supranote 20 at 645 [emphasis added].
75

R. v. Grant,[199113 S.C.R. 139, passim, Lamer J., writing in English.

' Ross, "Discretionary Authority," supranote 17 at 386.
7 See e.g. Irwin Toy Ltd v. Quebec (A.G.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 at 980, 983 [emphasis added];
also Eldidge v. British Columbia (A.G.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 at para. 84. A Quicklaw search yielded
dozens of instances of "prescrites par une r~gle de droit" in French translations of Supreme Court
judgments drafted in English. The term is much rarer in judgments drafted in French, though the search
revealed instances where the statements of constitutional questions, drafted in French, used the formula
"prescrite par une r~gle de droit." Some occurrences are prominent: both majority and minority reasons
in Little Sisters feature headings "Prescribed by Law" translated as "Prescrite par une r~gle de droit"
(supranote 19, paras. 144-45, 221-22).
78
Is it fair to expect a higher degree of consistency in the French translations approved by the
francophone judges such as Lamer (Slaigh and La Forest (E/dridge)? L'Heureux-Dub6 J.'s decisions
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point, ultimately, is not whether the judges of the Supreme Court have
deliberately approved the addition of prescrire to the French text.
Irrespective of the underlying intentions, these transpositions present to
readers of the French versions of judgments ideas of section 1 subtly but
importantly different from those generated by the French text of that
provision. Frequently, the judges of the Court appear not to apply a
meaning of section 1 hovering between the two language versions; often
enough, they seem straightforwardly to apply the English version of
section 1.
The Supreme Court's translators occasionally appear
embarrassed by the challenge of translating the English words
designating the threshold requirement in section 1. In the English
original of the majority reasons in Little Sisters,Justice Binnie writes of
a definition's having being "sufficiently certain to be 'prescribed by
law."' The inverted commas set off language lifted directly from the
Charter.In the French translation, "prescrite" infiltrates the inverted
commas purportedly setting off canonical constitutional language: "la
d6finition, telle qu'elle avait 6t6 interpr6t~e, avait un caract~re
suffisamment certain pour tre consid6r6e comme 'prescrite par une
r~gle de droit."'79 If "prescribed by law" are the words of the
constitutional drafters, whose words are "prescrite par une r~gle de
droit"? Admittedly, that formulation does not translate entirely what
seems to be the idea understood by readers of the English text after
Slaight. The translator of Little Sisters does not speak of a limit
"prescrite 16galement," but he or she hints that the resources of the
French text alone fall short. In an earlier judgment, Osborne v. Canada
(Treasury Board), the translator evades all awkwardness by rendering
"there is no 'limit prescribed by law"' as "il n'existe pas de restriction
prescrite par une r~gle de droit." s Abstinence from use of inverted
commas in that translation spares the hazard of acknowledging that
while the English text of section 1 supplies prescribed,the French offers
neither prescrite nor an equivalent. Did these translators sense
themselves as deferring to a tacit constitutional amendment? Or is this

sometimes appeared in French and English with no indication of the language of drafting. Teresa
Scassa, "Language of Judgment and the Supreme Court of Canada" (1994) 43 U.N.B.L.J. 169 at 176.
'9 Little Sisters, supranote 19 at para. 52.
80[1991] 2 S.C.R. 69 at 94.

Prescribedby La w/Une r~gle de droit

2007]

just one more instance of what is controversially identified as the
tendency in Canadian federal law of taking the English version as the
normative reference point?8 From time to time, however, the French'
text-rather, judges and translators working with it-writes back.
In Multani, Justices Deschamps and Abella submit that Justice
Lamer erred in Slaight by accepting an individualized administrative
decision as justifiable under section 1. Now, one may reasonably object
to the strict linguistic dualism performed by Slaight. But it at least
delivers readers of each official language a logical argument in relation
to their preferred language version of the Charter.Justices Deschamps
and Abella in Multani present an argument that, patently built on the
French text of the Charter,poses problems once translated into English.
Those judges submit that only norms of general application may
be subjected to Charterscrutiny and potentially justified under section 1.
Deploying administrative law for the review of "decisions et
ordonnances des organismes administratifs," they would reserve the
analysis of constitutional justification for testing the validity or
enforceability of a "norme comme une loi, un r~glement ou une autre
r~gle d'application g6n6rale de cette nature."82 The sharp distinction
between decisions and norms discloses a preference for a formal
taxonomic inquiry to determine which legal artifacts may be subjected
directly to Charterscrutiny and possibly justified under section 1. On
their view, only a legal artifact counting as "une r~gle de droit" is eligible.
Is it possible that they misread Justice Lamer's judgment in
Slaight? Justices Deschamps and Abella write:
Dans Slaight, le juge Lamer se dit d'avis
In Slaight,Lamer J. expressed the view that
qu'une ordonnance peut tre analys6e
an order can be analysed using the same
suivant les m~mes r~gles qu'une r~gle de
rules as are used to analyse a law in the
droit dans le contexte d'une contestation context of a constitutional challenge, and
constitutionnelle et ainsi 6tre justifi6e can thus be justified under s. I of the
selon l'article premier de la Charte Canadian Charter.3
canadienne.

8/ Kasirer, "Dire ou d6finir le droit?," supra note 36 at 168. Against preferring the English
version of federal laws, see Michel Bastarache, "Les difficultds relatives s la determination de
l'intention legislative dans le contexte du bijuridisme et du bilinguisme legislatif canadien" in G6mar &
Kasirer, supra note 69, 93 at 114.
82 Multanj supra note I at para. 103 [emphasis in original].

s3 Ibid.
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This account of Justice Lamer's reasons in the original French is
fair. It omits the genealogical and causal link, namely, that an order
could be analyzed in the same way because it came from (provient de)
"une r~gle de droit," but the oversight is likely insignificant. Justices
Deschamps and Abella's argument for clawing back the class of
justifiable limits on rights to only those things that are, in their own
right, "r~gles de droit" makes sense. It is readily arguable on textual
grounds, with reference to the French text of the Charterand the French
original of Justice Lamer's reasons in Slaight.
In contrast, the English translation of the concurrence in
Multani is more questionable. Debatable though they may be, current
translation practices generate an expectation that the phrase "une r~gle
de droit" in a French discussion of section 1 will be mirrored by
"prescribed by law" in the adjacent column of translated English. In
precisely this fashion, the English translation of Slaight replaces the
French language of the Charterwith the corresponding English words.
By contrast, the excerpt of the English translation of Multani
reproduced above nowhere includes the talismanic language of section
1. Instead, "une r~gle de droit"-the crucial term of art-is rendered
simply as "a law." Justices Deschamps and Abella do not only extirpate
the surreptitious transplant prescrire from their French discussion.
Adopting the French formal approach, they also expunge "prescribed
by" from the English, remaking the English text in the image of the
French. Translating "une r~gle de droit" as "a law" tout courteliminates
the textual support for the idea of authorization flowing down. Yet
section 1 nowhere refers to "a law." The French version refers to "une
r~gle de droit"; the English refers to limits "prescribed by law." Once
the French idea is translated into English, with no past participle, it will
of course seem problematic to treat an administrative order as "a law."
It is possible to say, in French, that Justice Lamer held that orders could
be analyzed using the same rules as "r~gles de droit." It is trickier to say,
speaking of the English text of the Charter,that Justice Lamer held that
an order can be analyzed using the same rules as used to analyze a law.
In his English translation, Justice Lamer does not analogize or equate
decisions to laws. He holds that since both may legally prescribe a limit
to a Charterright, both may thus be justified under section 1. In the
English translation of Slaight, an order does not fall under section 1
because it "arises -from" a legal artifact that is uncontroversially
susceptible of justification, as was the case of the ordonnance "provenant
d'une r~gle de droit." Rather, Justice Lamer holds that an order may
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be a justifiable limit because, in precisely the same way as a statutory or
regulatory provision, it "is prescribed by law." In the English text, the
adjudicator's order in Slaight falls squarely within the category of
justifiable limits. There is no analogy here to the conclusion, based on
the French text, that "une ordonnance" is not "une r~gle de droit."
Obviously an administrative decision is not "a law" in the ordinary
sense.8 5 But that is not dispositive of whether its limit on a right is
"prescribed by law."
No approach canvassed thus far-neither Justice Lamer's
dualism, nor the tacit efforts to add prescrite to 1'articlepremierand to
delete "prescribed" from section 1-lives up to the admittedly exacting
aspirations of legal bilingualism and constitutional justice. But arguments
based on solely the language of the text may miss an important
dimension. The discrepancy may lie not in different texts, but in
different readers: who reads, and where. One reason that direct and
total translation is impossible is that the ostensibly equivalent term in
the destination language may carry symbolic and semantic baggage
different from that of the original.86 At times, the difficulty with two
language versions will be "at heart what we would call cultural."" Law's
language, in particular, is cultural, "inscrite dans l'histoire." 8 The
phenomenon may be especially potent in law's Canadian dominion,
where two official languages and two legal traditions (or more!) interact.
The idea is explored often enough in comparative private law, where the
mixed sources of Quebec private law and their bilingual expression
comprise a "v6ritable laboratoire d'acculturation." 9 Yet though the
cultural embeddedness of the different language versions of the Charter
has attracted less attention, assuming that the complex relations

84Slaight,supra note 2 at 1080 [emphasis added].
85 Against assuming that "legal rules of whatever kind can be described as 'laws,"' see Lon
L. Fuller, Anatomy of the Law (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976) at 96 [Fuller, Anatomjj.
86 On the different discursive and symbolic effects of notionally identical equivalents, see
Roderick A. Macdonald with Clarisse Kehler Siebert, "Orchestrating Legal Multilingualism: 12
Etudes" in G6mar & Kasirer, supra note 69, 377 at 387.
87 James Boyd White, Justice as Translation:An Essay in Culturaland Legal Criticism
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990) at 244.
8' Gerard Cornu, Linguistiquejuridique, 3d ed. (Paris: Montchrestien, 2005) at 17, 19. See
also Pierre Legrand, "Issues in the Translatability of Law" in Sandra Bermann & Michael Wood, eds.,
Nation,Language,and the Ethics of Translation(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005) 30.
59

Kasirer, "Dire ou ddfinir le droit?," supra note 36 at 144 [footnote omitted].

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 45, NO. 3

enmeshing culture and law operate only in private law may be mistaken.
What if the linguistic discrepancies in section 1 function as a
smokescreen, obscuring cultural differences that could survive
authoritative harmonization of the texts, or, less drastic, careful reading
of both versions?9" Understanding Justices Deschamps and Abella's
argument with the majority in Multani may call for sensitivity to cultural
differences. Perhaps the reluctance to accept administrative orders as
justifiable limits on rights, and the desire for a bright-line distinction
between general norms and individual decisions, reflects cultural roots.
IV.

BEYOND LINGUISTIC DIFFERENCE

Comparatist proponents of legal culture have examined
administrative law less often than other fields, such as criminal law and civil
litigation. Little effort has been expended to apply comparatist
methodologies to Quebec administrative law vis-A-vis administrative law
practiced elsewhere in Canada. The odd article has aimed to elucidate the
principles unifying judicial review in Ontario, Quebec, and federal courts.9 '
Other studies have occasionally shown greater interest in differences.9 2
Before essaying a preliminary contribution to the endeavour, it
-should be acknowledged that the idea of legal culture is controversial.
One set of critiques targets the notion's uncertainty,9 3 though not without
provoking vigorous defences.94 Assuming for the sake of argument that
the notion has useful content, a more pressing matter is perhaps its
politics. Culture "as an epistemological instrument" might be thought to
contribute to "an epistemology of conflict"; the notion of tradition may be
o One might conjecture that the failure of scholars outside Quebec working in English to
embrace the translation of a major Quebec work (Ren6 Dussault & Louis Borgeat, Administrative
Law: A Treatise, 2d ed., 5 vols., trans. Murray Rankin (Toronto: Carswell, 1985-1990) [Dussault &
Borgeat, Administrative Law) indicates a remainder of cultural difference beyond.language.
"' Patrick Robardet, "Le contr6le judiciaire de la procedure administrative: 61lments de
droit compare, f~d~ral, ontarien et qu~b6cois" (1982) 23 C. de D. 651 at 653-54.
'See e.g. Roderick A. Macdonald, "La doctrine: source de droit administratif qu~b~cois?"

(1984) 29 McGill L.J. 340; Robert Leckey, "Territoriality in Canadian Administrative Law" (2004)
54 U.T.L.J. 327 [Leckey, "Territoriality"].
9' On the value of disaggregating culture, see Roger Cotteirell, "Comparative Law and
Legal Culture" in Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann, eds., The Oxford Handbook of
ComparativeLaw (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 709 at 736.
9' Lawrence M. Friedman, "The Concept of Legal Culture: A Reply" in David Nelken, ed.,
ComparilgLegal Cultures (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997) 33; Pierre Legrand, "Comparative Legal
Studies and the Matter of Authenticity" (2006) 1 J.C.L. 365 [Legrand, "Authenticity"].
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preferable.9 5 Yet here there are reasons for preferring culture, bearing in
' 96
mind that culture can have a "nonessential, internally multiple character."
An emphasis on legal traditions typically distinguishes common law from
civil law. This article's hypothesis about Quebec administrative law
underscores something subtler, more latent and interstitial than
interactions between traditions tracking the outmoded idea of legal
systems or families. While the legal tradition of administrative law in
Quebec, and across Canada, is notionally that of English public common
law, a distinctive legal culture may nonetheless persist in the crannies.
Though traditions "may absorb foreign elements" and embrace
"internal elements of variance or dissidence,"97 the tendencies identified
here are not simply absorbed or contained. The working hypothesis is
that, despite commonality at the broad level of legal tradition dictated
by the constitutional framework, cultural elements "may make for
specificity where specificity has been denied." 98
What makes the matter so intriguing is that, in formal
constitutional terms, there is so little space for a distinctive Quebec
culture of administrative law practiced in French. As a consequence of
administrative and legislative arrangements following the conquest, and
judicial interpretations of them, the civil law applies within Quebec in
matters of property and civil rights. In contrast, the public law applicable
throughout Canada, including administrative law, derives from English
law. 99 English law is the "source fondamentale de notre droit
administratif."'1 ° In principle, it should be relatively uniform across the
federation, although the theory of sources of law prioritizes applicable
legislation and regulations before recourse to the common law. And

95 H. Patrick Glenn, "Legal Cultures and Legal Traditions" in Mark Van Hoecke, ed.,
Epistemologyand Methodology of ComparativeLaw(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004) 7 at 17.
96 Legrand, "Authenticity," supranote 94 at 376 n. 43.

91 H. Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World. Sustainable Diversity in Law, 3d ed.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 37.
1 This phrase is taken from an examination of variation within a matter of federal
jurisdiction: Nicholas Kasirer, "The Annotated Criminal Code en version qu b coise: Signs of
Territoriality in Canadian Criminal Law" (1990) 15 Dal. L.J. 520 at 525.
1 On the "disordered state of legal affairs" during the English colonial period, see John
E.C. Brierley & Roderick A. Macdonald, eds., Quebec Civil Law: An Introduction to Quebec
PrivateLaw(Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1993) at para. 13.
161 Pierre Issalys & Denis Lemieux, L'action gouvernementale: Precis de droit des
institutionsadministratives,2d ed. (Cowansville, Qc.: Yvon Blais, 2002) at 39.
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admittedly, statute books in all jurisdictions show considerable
legislative alteration of the administrative law inherited from the British
conquerors and settlers.
The legislature of Quebec has relocated a number of the most
important principles of "le droit administratif britannique" in the more
precise, but also more rigid framework of the Code of CivilProcedure.'°
The codification of the prerogative writs has been viewed as "freezing
them in time."' 2 That said, judicial review has for a long time been
channelled through statutes at the federal level and in common law
provinces too. °3 It has been argued that these particularities make
Quebec administrative law original and different from the corresponding
law "au Canada et au Royaume-Uni.""' Is there an irony in this detection
of particularity given the influence of English law on the confection of
1"5 It would
Quebec's original Code of Civil Procedure?
be remiss not to
mention as well the entrenchment of a quasi-constitutional right. Quebec's
CharterofHuman Rights and Freedomsguarantees every person "a full
and equal, public and fair hearing by an independent and impartial
tribunal, for the determination of his rights and obligations."'' 6
The private law re-codification in the early nineties instated a
further change. Article 1376 of the Civil Code of Ou&bec applies the
book on obligations to the state and its bodies. The legislature has, to an
extent, replaced the public common law with the civil code. Consequent
to this process of "civilisation," Quebec administrative law is said to be
henceforth "impr~gn" with the values of the civil law. 0 7 Important as

101Ren6 Dussault & Louis Borgeat, Traitddedroitadministratif2d ed., vol. 1 (Quebec: Presses de
l'Universit6 Laval, 1984) at 28 [Dussault & Borgeat, Trait, vol. 1]. For the codification of the prerogative
writs, see art. 846 C.C.P. Quebec courts have taken art. 33 C.C.P., which confirms the Superior Court's
"superintending and reforming power," as authorizing a new remedy, the direct action in nulity.
o2 Denis Lemieux, "The Codification of Administrative Law in Quebec" in Grant Huscroft

& Michael Taggart, eds., Inside and Outside CanadianAdministrative Law: Essays in Honour of
David Mullan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006) 240 at 247.
13 David J. Mullan, "Reform of Judicial Review of Administrative Action-The Ontario
Way" (1974) 12 Osgoode Hall L.J. 125 at 125 n. 5.
104Dussault & Borgeat, Traiti vol. 1, supra note 101 at 28. Note the implication that the
law "au Canada" does not include law "au Qu6bec."
" Jean-Maurice Brisson, La formation d'un droit mixte: l'dvolution de la proc6dure civile
de 1774 1867(Montreal: Th~mis, 1986) at 99-110.

'04 R.S.Q. c. C-12, s. 23.
Denis Lemieux, "Le r6le du Code civil du Qu6bec en droit administratif" (2005) 18
C.J.A.L.P. 119 at 121, 125, 132, 141.
107
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this legislative change may be, a scholar had, a quarter century before
article 1376's entry into force, detected a vocation for the civil law of
supplying the substantive content of private law notions referred to by
administrative law. Moreover, Michel Rambourg had understood that
vocation as having historically produced within administrative law
18
particularities derived from the existence of the civil law.
Institutionally, the legislature of Quebec has created the
Administrative Tribunal of Qu6bec. °9 This "m6ga-tribunal administratif"
exercises a general appellate jurisdiction larger, on one scholarly
estimation, than those of the municipal courts and the Court of
Qu6bec." ° This tribunal may reflect admiration for the Conseil d'ltat
and an attempt to emulate it within (perhaps) operative constitutional
constraints. Notice of the effect of these legislative modifications to
administrative law within Quebec can be suitably complemented by a
subtler observation.
The scholarship signals that the permeation of Quebec
administrative law with values borrowed from the civil law and,
specifically, from France has a life of its own beyond legislative
incorporation. If administrative law scholars are not quite, as Shelley said
of poets, the unacknowledged legislators of the world, they nonetheless
exert a discernible influence on understandings of administrative law.
Indeed, the idea of administrative law seems different in the Quebec texts
published in French than in offerings published elsewhere in English.
David Mullan begins his book by speaking of the "statutory and
prerogative authorities that form the administrative state.'' This is not
necessarily the same thing as lAdministration,which, however plural its
arms, is consistently spoken of in French-language work as a single entity:
112
'Tensemble des organes administratifs f~d6raux et qu~b~cois."

"o Michel Rambourg, "Notions g6n6rales sur le droit administratif canadien et qu b6cois"
in Raoul P. Barbe, ed., Droit administratifcanadienet qu6becois (Ottawa: Editions de l'Universit6
d'Ottawa, 1969) 1 at 32-34 [Barbe, ed., Droitadministrati].
109
An Act respectingadministrativejustice, R.S.O. c. J-3.

"oGilles P~pin, "La loi qu6b6coise sur lajustice administrative" (1997) 57 R. du B. 633 at 646,658.
"
David J. Mullan, Administrative Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001) at 8; similarly Lord
Woolf, Jeffrey Jowell & A.P. Le Sueur, de Smith, Woolf & Jowell's Principles of JudicialReview
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1999) at 61.
"2 Dussault & Borgeat, Traite,vol. 1, supra note 101 at 60. Other definitions are similar,

and the common idea of an ensemble is striking. Patrice Garant, Precis de droit des administrations
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Although it should not be overstated, the English idea of the Crown and
beneath it multiple ministers may contrast with the French idea of the
Administration as an ensemble.
Administrative law and droit administratifdo not evoke identical
associations. It is far from settled that "droit administratif" in Quebec
scholarship refers automatically to the heritage of British public law. At
times, it seems that the point of departure is administrative law scholarship
from France. The close ties of Quebec scholars to French legal sources in
matters of private law have been thoroughly traced, and are unsurprising.
But in administrative law they are more notable. When Dussault and
Borgeat define "droit administratif," their first three references are to
sources from France." 3 Five different works on the administrative law of
France populate the first two footnotes of a chapter by Patrice Garant on
"L'Administration d6centralis6e. '114 Another scholar provides an extended
critical discussion of "Diverses conceptions du droit administratif" that
dismisses Dicey's theory as important "sur le plan de l'histoire du droit
administratif anglo-saxon," but no longer seriously defended. That
commentator concludes by adopting a definition of "le droit administratif"
proffered by the French jurist de Laubadre." 5 In a discussion titled
"Caract~res originaux du droit administratif qu6b6cois," Rambourg
speaks of the '[i]nfluence du droit anglais, ' ' . 6 as if it were an external
force and not the substance of Quebec administrative law itself. A jarring
disjuncture is discernable between talk of the influence of English law,
which seems to understand it as, at best, a persuasive authority, and
acknowledgement that following the conquest, "[lie droit public anglais
s'est impos6 au Canada tout entier."' 7 Viewing the rise of administrative
tribunals and of the federal courts as effecting a minor rapprochement
between the English principle of the rule of law and "[le] 'droit administratif

publiques, 4th ed. (Cowansville, Qc.: Yvon Blais, 2005) at 3 [Garant, Pr&is; Issalys & Lemieux,
supranote 100 at 40.
"Dussault

& Borgeat, Trait, vol. 1, ibid.at 17-18 n. 28-30.

114Patrice Garant, Droit administratif,5th ed. (Cowansville, Qc.: Yvon Blais, 2004) at 99-100

n. 1, 2. Compare Canadian common law scholarship in French, e.g. Michel Bastarache & Andr6a
Boudreau Ouellet, Precisdu droitdes biens reels, 2d ed. (Cowansville, Qc.: Yvon Blais, 2001).
" Rambourg, supra note 108 at 5, 11.
"' Ibid.at 30 [emphasis added].

'Ibid. [Trans.] "English public law was imposed on all of Canada."
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franqais"" 8 likely presupposes an attachment to French administrative law
greater than typical among administrative lawyers working in English.
The point must not, however, be exaggerated: the steps towards a duality
of jurisdictions are not the result of direct and systematic borrowing from
the French model. 19 Such cautions duly registered, that "le droit
administratif' tout court often refers to French public law, while English
public law takes a qualifier-"le droit administratif anglo-saxon"-hints
at a sturdy resistance on the part of some Quebec scholars working in
French to the imposition of English public law, or at least a reluctance to
regard it as the indigenous administrative law of Quebec.
The preference for French over English administrative law varies
in the explicitness of its expression. One arresting, relatively early example
is found in the assumption by Quebec scholars, in a distinguished line
stretching back at least as far as Pierre-Basile Mignault, of the
applicability in Quebec law of the French theory of la dualitd domaniale.
Prominent as it was in scholarship over decades, the notion that the state
holds title to both public and private domains has been discredited as
incompatible with the unitary Crown.' More recently, it has been
common to encounter rather wistful acknowledgement that defining "le
in France, whereas English
contrat administratif" is "relativement facile"
12
doctrine unanimously denies its existence. 1
Delineating the ambitions of administrative law scholarship also
reveals French influence. Quebec administrative law scholarship
manifests a descriptive, classificatory bent not typically shared by work
elsewhere in Canada.1 22 Often it aspires to reproduce contemporary
reality with exactitude.1 23 Extensive formal classification of the
"/ Genevieve Cartier & Suzanne Comtois, "La reconnaissance d'une forme mitig6e de
dualit6 de juridictions en droit administratif canadien" in H. Patrick Glenn, Droit qudbdcois et
droit franiais: communaut, autonomie, concordance (Cowansville, Qc.: Yvon Blais, 1993) 487 at
512 [Glenn, Droitquibdcoisl.

119Ibid.
12 Jules Briire, "La dualit6 domaniale au Qu6bec" in Barbe, ed., Droit administratif,supra

note 108, 313.
2) Dussault & Borgeat, Trait, vol. 1, supra note 101 at 602-603. For a more critical eye
directed towards the notion in France and a subtler account of the situation in Quebec, see Andr6e
Lajoie, Contratsadministratifs.'jalonspour une thorie (Montreal: Th~mis, 1984) at 11-18.
"zAlbert S.Abel, Book Review of Traitd de droit administratifcanadienet quebdcois by
Ren6 Dussault (1976) 26 U.T.L.J. 121 at 122.
I'1 This aspiration may reflect an epistemology fixed on the present, under the thrall of
which European treatises take account neither of the past nor of the future. Roderick A.
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emanations of the Administration has much deeper roots in Frenchlanguage administrative law scholarship than in English. The Frenchlanguage texts carry on a tradition of description that situates
"administrative law within a global theory of the state," locating
governmental institutions "within a sophisticated, at times Byzantine,
taxonomy." ' 4 They exemplify a more general "civilian penchant for
defining terms in the abstract and organizing the field rigorously in
advance.""t Indeed, the primary ambition of many of the Frenchlanguage texts is to impose taxonomic order on the unruly diversity of
the Administration. Consequently, le contentieux judiciaire tends to
appear much later in the monographs and manuals than judicial review
appears in English-language texts.126 The observation is not original to
the present author, and indeed Quebec scholars are fully aware of it.
Dussault and Borgeat write of their treatise's ambition to treat
administrative law within a "kind of comprehensive framework," one
devoting "as much, if not more, attention to the structures and the
actual operation of the Administration as to the control which is
'
exercised over governmental activity."127
This traditional layout of the
French-language texts hints at a particular understanding of the
enterprise. In what two French authors neutrally call "l'approche
habituelle," administrative law is seen from the point of view of the

Macdonald, Book Review of Trait6 de droit administratif2d ed., vol. 3 by Ren6 Dussault & Louis
Borgeat (1991) 34 Can. Pub. Admin. 224 at 227.
' 24 Leckey, "Territoriality," supra note 92 at 336.
Nicholas Kasirer, "English PrivateLaw, Outside-in" (2003) 3 Oxford U. Commonwealth
L.J. 249 at 256. On the intellectual rigours of the French organization of administrative law treatises
and the perils posed by orthodox juridical categories, see Roderick A. Macdonald, "Rorientation
de la recherche en droit administratif canadien" (1987) 30 Can. Pub. Admin. 489 at 491, 495.
126 Dussault & Borgeat, Traiti4 supra note 101, devote vol. 1 to "Le r6le du droit dans
l'Administration," "Les structures de ]'Administration," and "Les actes de l'Administration."
Volume 2 (1986) addresses "La gestion de l'Administration." Volume 3 (1989) tackles the Englishlanguage administrative lawyer's primary preoccupation, "Les contr6les exerc6s sur
l'Administration." Garant, Prdcis, supra note 112, follows a similar organization. Compare
placement of "Le contr6le des actes de I'Administration" early in Pierre Lemieux, Droit
administratif doctrine et jurisprudence, 4th ed. (Sherbrooke: Les Editions Revue de Droit de
l'Universit6 de Sherbrooke, 2006), c. 2.
127 Dussault & Borgeat, Administrative Law, vol. 1, supra note 90 at vii. John S. Bell,
"Comparative Administrative Law" in Reimann & Zimmermann, supra note 93, 1259 at 1261,
notes that administrative law in the continental European traditions is concerned with the powers
and organization of the executive organs of the state, while the common law use of the term is more
synonymous with "administrative litigation."
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Administration. In an effort to "renew" the discipline, they propose a
contrasting viewpoint, one privileging the viewpoint of the person
targeted by administrative action.128 Perhaps concern for the individual
affected by administrative action is part of what inspires the Englishlanguage administrative law monographs-in a fashion one may
associate more broadly with the common law-to focus on remedies
129
rather than on classifications and relationships prior to litigation.
As if the organization of the French-language texts does not
reveal sufficiently their quest for order, such striving sometimes finds
open expression. Garant, endeavouring to classify the administrative
entities composing the Administration, seeks the simplest criteria
permitting "d'ordonner la r6alit6 toujours complexe." Administrative law
scholarship must organize the raw material offered by the legislative will
and discover relationships uniting institutions and rules: "transformer en
un tout intelligible l'apparent chaos du r6el."' 3 ° If characterizing this
ambition as Cartesian brings the comparatist perilously close to
comparative law as caricature, it bears notice nevertheless. Only with this
taxonomic enterprise in mind can one fully appreciate the attraction of
understanding the threshold requirement in section 1 as calling for a
clear, sustainable ex ante distinction between norms of general
application and individual decisions on the basis that only the former
merit the dignity of the label "r~gles de droit."
Before re-reading the concurrence in Multani, the .historically
contingent and specific character of this legal culture of le droit
administratifqudbdcoisrequires attention. Three elements are likely most
influential in forming that culture-the French language, the civil law,
and scholarship and law from France. They are organically related and
mutually enforcing such that it is impossible to isolate the causal effect of
each. Furthermore, recognition of change over time is necessary. Richly
revealing as it is, the example of la dualitddomaniale,stretching back into

12 Jean-Louis Autin & Catherine Ribot, Droitadministratifgendral,3d ed. (Paris: tditions

du Juris-Classeur, 2004) at para. 38.
29
Woolf, Jowell & Le Sueur, supra note 111, opens with, as Part 1, "The Scope of Judicial
Review." See also Mullan, supra note 111, of which judicial review occupies the lion's share. For
systematic exposition nearer to the apparent French tendency, see Sir William Wade,
Administrative Law, 9th ed. by Sir William Wade & Christopher Forsyth (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2004) Part 1I.
'3o Garant, Droit administratif supra note 114 at 99. [Trans.] "to transform the apparent
chaos of the real into an intelligible whole."
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the nineteenth century, is not proof of an historically constant association
between administrative law in Quebec and in France. For the most part,
the French administrative law doctrine cited by Quebec authors in the
contemporary era crossed the Atlantic in the twentieth century. It did not
migrate, pre-conquest, with the Custom of Paris and other ancien droit
franais.13 1 Indeed, as recently as the mid-twentieth century, connections
with English public law appeared rather stronger than they do today, and
those with France rather weaker.'32 The point to underscore is two-fold:
within the legal culture of administrative law practiced in French within
Quebec, scholarship from France is strongly influential; but the culture is
not static insofar as that influence has varied historically. This article
cannot trace the story, but consciousness of a distinct administrative law
within Quebec, attaching to France, likely intensified following the Quiet
Revolution with other political, economic, and cultural developments.
While re-readings of legal sources have already revealed Quebec's civilian
private law to be a less homogeneous and fixed nationalist resource than
is sometimes supposed,133 it would be worth tracing more thoroughly the
ebb and flow of various currents within the province's administrative law.
In any event, the legal culture adumbrated here provides resources for a
second look at the concurrence in Multan; one in which a number of its
propositions will appear less mysterious and more anchored in a rich
jurisprudential tradition.
Returning to section 1, the rigorous expectations derived from
French-language administrative law intensify the frustration expressed,
post-Slaight, with "[clette confusion entre la notion d'ordonnance
administrative et celle de r~gle de droit."' 3 4 Distinguishing two contrasts
will aid in understanding the differences between the majority and
minority judges in Multani One, as a matter of administrative
131 On historical sources of Quebec law, see John E.C. Brierley, "Quebec's 'Common Laws'
(Droits communs): How Many Are There?" in Ernest Caparros, ed., Mdlanges Louis-Philippe
Pigeon (Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur, 1989) 109.
132Gerald E. LeDain, "The Twilight of Judicial Control in the Province of Quebec?" (1952)

1 McGill L.J. 1.
33 David Howes, "From Polyjurality to Monojurality: The Transformation of Quebec Law,
1875-1929" (1987) 32 McGill L.J. 523. In a rich historical study, Jean-Philippe Garneau, "Une
culture de l'amalgame au pr~toire: les avocats de Quebec et l'6laboration d'un langage juridique
commun au tournant des XVIIIe et XIXe si~cles" (2007) 88 Can. Hist. Rev. 113 at 145-46 [footnote
omitted], argues that "lafronti~re entre les deux univers culturels est loin d'6tre aussi 6tanche
qu'une lecture essentialiste de lar~alit6 coloniale pourrait le faire croire."
I Pinard, supra note 32 at 119.
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classification, is that of regulation versos individual decision.
Administrative law scholars working in French or English, attentive to
civil or common law influences, will find common ground in this contrast,
however untidy it proves empirically. The other contrast derives directly
from section 1 of the Charter.It concerns whether a limit on a right may
be subjected to Charteranalysis and justified under section 1. From the
French text, the contrast is between "une r~gle de droit" and not "une
r~gle de droit." From the English text, it is "prescribed by law" versus not
"prescribed by law." In a nutshell, the dispute between the judges in
Multani turns on the relation of the two contrasts. In administrative law
from France, and in administrative law scholarship written in French in
Quebec, a regulation is "une r~gle de droit" and a decision is not "une
r~gle de droit." The two contrasts overlap perfectly. But in Englishlanguage administrative law, the classifications "prescribed by law" and
not "prescribed by law" do not reliably track the categories of regulation
and individual decision.
Within the classical civilian tradition, the legislature makes laws of
general application; judges resolving individual disputes apply the law as it
exists. "Tout juge dit le droit," says G6rard Cornu, with lapidary elegance,
of the civilian tradition; "aucun ne l'6dicte."' 35 From a formal point of
view, decided cases are not a source of law.'36 The classic civilian stance
disdains "la casuistique, qui situe la r~gle de droit au niveau des cas
concrets."' 37 A parallel distinction attracts staunch support in Frenchlanguage administrative law scholarship. In an Administration properly
ordained and classified according to the approach of the treatises, a
regulation and an individual decision are sharply distinct, indeed, virtually

135

G6rard Cornu, L art du droit en qu6te de sagesse (Paris: Presses Universitaires de

France, 1998) at 175. [Trans.] "Every judge applies the law, none creates it." Demonstrative of the
perils of the enterprise, the appropriate translation of Cornu's statement is not obvious. In the
context, appliesseems an appropriate translation for dit, although in another setting the same verb
dire, contrasted with the more mechanical ex6cuter, signifies the French judge's creative mission:
Philippe Jestaz, Le droit, 5th ed. (Paris: Dalloz, 2007) at 19.
136 Georges Ripert & Jean Boulanger, Trait6 de droit civil d'aprsle trait6 de Planiol,t. 1
(Paris: L.G.D.J., 1956) at para. 236. Contrast McIntyre J.'s implicit acknowledgement, while
concluding that the Charterdoesnot apply to private disputes, that judges nonetheless "develop the
principles of the common law": R WDSU v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [198612 S.C.R. 573 at 603. For
comparative discussion, see Philippe Jestaz, Les sourcesdu droit (Paris: Dalloz, 2005) at 51-69.

"' Ren6 David & Camille Jauffret-Spinosi, Les grands syst~mes de droit contemporain,
11th ed. (Paris: Dalloz, 2002) at para. 69. [Trans.] "casuistry, which situates the legal rule at the
level of concrete cases."
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opposites. Thus French authors carefully distinguish administrative rulemaking functions from the making of individual decisions.131 Dussault and
Borgeat spell out the distinction:
[Allors qu'une d6cision a g6n6ralement pour but d'appliquer ou de pr6ciser laloi dans une
situation particuli~re touchant les droits ou les int6rets d'une ou de quelques personnes,
une norme vise A6tablir un 3ordre
juridique nouveau ou modifi6, en 6tablissant A l'avance
9
des r~gles de comportement

The distinction is a central organizing principle of Quebec
administrative law scholarship, 4 ° although scholarly treatments sometimes
fail to explain its importance and to recognize it as the frequent result of
judicial characterization expost' t4 '
It is now worth reproducing the core of Justices Deschamps and
Abella's analysis. They write:
An administrative body determines an individual's rights in relation to a particular issue.
A decision or order made by such a body is not a law or regulation, but is instead the
result of a process provided for by statute and by the principles of administrative law in a
given case.

They continue:
A law or regulation, on the other hand, is enacted or made by the legislature or by a body
to which powers are delegated. The norm so established is not limited to a specific case.
It is general in scope. Establishing
a norm and resolving a dispute are not usually
14
considered equivalent processes. 1

'Jean Rivero & Jean Waline, Droit administratif19th ed. (Paris: Dalloz, 2002) at paras.
90-94; Yves Gaudemet, Droit administratif18th ed. (Paris: L.G.D.J., 2005) at 258-64.
'-' Dussault & Borgeat, TraitM vol. 1, supra note 101 at 404. [Trans.] "while a decision
generally has the objective of applying to one or several persons, a norm aims to establish a new
juridical order or to modify one, establishing rules of conduct in advance."
140 "Les Actes de l'Administration," the second half of ibid, comprises three chapters: "La
D6cision," "Le R~glement," and "Le Contrat." In Garant, Droit administratif,supra note 114, the
distinction is perhaps less foundational, though "L'Action administrative," "Le R~glement
(16gislation d16gu6e)," and "Les Contrats des autorit6s publiques" occupy consecutive chapters
each roughly a hundred pages long.
141 Roderick A. Macdonald, Book Review of Traitd de drFoitadministratif2d ed., vol. 1 by
Ren6 Dussault & Louis Borgeat (1985) 28 Can. Pub. Admin. 178 at 179-80.
2
" Multani supra note 1 at para. 112. For concerns that the opposition between "normative

law" and "administrative decisions" discounts the legal force of the decisions of statutory delegates
and the variety of statutorily delegated functions, see David Phillip Jones, "Recent Developments
in Administrative Law" (paper presented to the Canadian Bar Association's National Administrative
Law and Labour & Employment Law CLE Conference, Ottawa, 24 & 25 November 2006) at 21.
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Justices Deschamps and Abella refer to no authors when they contrast
establishing a norm with resolving a dispute, but one could be forgiven
for suspecting that at least Justice Deschamps had Dussault and Borgeat
in mind, if not on her desk.
The distinction between making a norm and deciding an
individual case receives lesser attention in contemporary Englishlanguage scholarship. Indeed, it is fashionable to eschew formalism in
favour of functionalism. Yet however contestable the finer points of the
distinction's operation, it is unavoidable. It is necessary for determining
the application of a duty of procedural fairness and of requirements
such as those in the Statutory Instruments Act.143 The distinction rests
on sound concerns about the appropriateness and legitimacy of the
different processes used in the two activities.' 4' As abhorrence for bills
of attainder testifies, common law constitutional orders are alert to the
distinction, central to the separation of powers, between individual
adjudicative acts and enacted general norms. Invalidating as ultra vires
(in the administrative law sense) delegated legislation that targets
particular subjects, rather than announces general norms, reflects similar
preoccupations. That said, in practice the distinction can prove refractory.
The experience of common law adjudication seems to unsettle
the sharp distinction between enunciation of a rule and resolution of an
individual dispute. Every judgment in an individual case decides the rule
of law for which it is authority as against all the world (stare decisis) and
decides the issues of fact and law between the parties (resjudicata).The
doctrine of precedent in the common law holds that "rules of law are
developed in the very process of application. ... For the fundamental
notion is that the law should result from being applied to live issues
raised between actual parties and argued on both sides., 145 Admittedly,
the notion that rules are developed in the process of adjudication
contrasts with another view that deciding disputes simply reveals or
recognizes existing customary rules. Yet even when turning from the

' 43 R.S.C. 1985, c. S-22.
'4 Different legal processes are masterfully explored in Kenneth I. Winston, ed., The
Principles of Social Order: Selected Essays of Lon L. Fuller, rev. ed. (Oxford: Hart Publishing,
2001) Part II.

"4P.J. Fitzgerald, Salmond on Jurisprudence,12th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1966)
at 177. On confusions between stare decisis and res judicata, see Rupert Cross & J.W. Harris,
Precedentin English Law, 4th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991) at 97.
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common law to legislative enactments, a bright-line distinction can
appear somewhat arbitrary. Rules of general application must still be
interpreted, and much of a statute's meaning derives from "a judicial
146
gloss on those words."'
The situation in Multani may indicate the functional overlap of
rule-making with individual decision-making. If in principle an
administrative decision lays down no norm of general application, in
practice many administrative decisions -affect large numbers of people.
Presumably the scholastic council of commissioners in Multani
understood their application of the Code de vie as prohibiting all Sikhs
from wearing a kirpan. Had another Sikh student claimed this right, the
board likely would not have treated that claim as a fresh issue calling for
new deliberation. Discussing reasonable accommodation, Justices
Deschamps and Abella write that an "administrative law analysis is
microcosmic, whereas a constitutional law analysis is generally
macrocosmic.', 47 This distinction is not fully convincing. Is it not possible
that, within their institutional constraints, the commissioners undertook a
broad analysis, locating Gurban Multani's claim within a larger context,
one partly constituted by their
understanding of macro issues such as
9 48
secularism and student safety?'
It would be mistaken, however, to associate exploration of these
overlaps in legal functions exclusively with those working within the
common law tradition, or working only in English. Civilians in France
increasingly recognize that nothing precludes the emergence of general
rules through the normal exercise of the adjudicative function. 49 And
within Quebec, a scholar has admitted that "l'activit6 cr6atrice du juge
en mati~re administrative" muddies the distinction between dictating a
norm and deciding a case.15 ° Nonetheless, within the civil law tradition,

" Fuller, Anatomy, supra note 85 at 102.
' 4 7 Multarn supra note 1 at para. 132.
143 To the extent the microcosmic versus macrocosmic distinction has purchase in Multan,
it might distinguish not administrative from judicial proceedings, but the original arrangement of
reasonable accommodation, concluded between the school board's legal counsel and the boy's
parents, from the board's and council's decisions that that accommodation violated the Code de vie.
"4 Jacques Ghestin & Gilles Goubeaux, Traitd de droit civit. Introductiongdndrale, 3d ed.
(Paris: L.G.D.J., 1990) at para. 438.
' Pierre Lemieux, "Les reactions de la doctrine h la creation du droit par les juges en droit

administratif" (1980) 21 C. de D. 277 at 290. [Trans.] "the judge's creative activity in administrative
matters." Acknowledgement of practices blurring the distinction between laws and regulations as
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legislatively posited rules unquestionably enjoy a prestige not shared
with the interstitial rules grudgingly acknowledged as accreting from
judicial .decisions. 15
Whatever the difficulties of applying the regulation-decision
distinction, it is a necessary one, shared by administrative lawyers working
in either language. The same cannot, however, be said of the second
contrast, which conscripts the respective language versions of section 1
to fashion the categories "une r~gle de droit"/not "une r~gle de droit"
and "prescribed by law"/not "prescribed by law."
Appreciating the French-language debates about the threshold
requirement in section 1 requires a step beyond acknowledging the
norm/decision dichotomy. It is not just that French doctrine evokes the
idea. Rather, the French expression for the threshold requirement in the
Charter,"une r~gle de droit," is one of the key terms for the idea of law.
A leading comparative monograph-if admittedly of an earlier generation
in method and outlook-presents the "mani6re dont est conque la r~gle
de droit" as a central element assuring 'Tunit6 de la famille" among those
countries following the civil law tradition.'
The "r~gle de droit"
guarantees "le prestige qui s'attache A la science du droit," and as if the
stakes were not already high, it is codification's "base fondamentale,"
without which that endeavour is impossible.'53 The phrase used in section
1 is symbolically freighted in the civilian tradition. How easily is it defined,
and what does it mean?
Pinard and Gaudet, in the leading critiques of Slaightpublished in
French, differ as to the ordinary meaning of "une r~gle de droit." For
Gaudet, defining the notion "n'est certes pas facile."' 54 Pinard finds the task

general and impersonal acts and individual decisions appears also in Issalys & Lemieux, supra note
100 at 451.
's' It
is an historical peculiarity of Quebec law that, following the instatement of a
legislative assembly in 1791, legislated law was perceived as threatening the multiplicity of sources
of existing French law. Champions of French law thus defined themselves as adversaries of
parliamentary law. Obviously the worry that legislation is necessarily linked in form and substance
to English law dissipated soon afterwards. Pierre Issalys, "La r6daction legislative et lar6ception de
latechnique franqaise" in Glenn, Droitqudb6cois,supra note 118, 119 at 129. See also Brierley &
Macdonald, supranote 99 at paras. 13-15.
'-5David & Jauffret-Spinosi, supra note 137 at para. 69. [Trans.] "the 'way of conceiving
the legal rule' as a central element assuring 'family unity."'
IIbid.at paras. 69-70.

'5 4 Gaudet, supra note 40 at 455.
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much easier, since the idea has a "signification consacr6e et relativement
1 55
pr6cise. I1 s'agit d'une norme abstraite d'application g6n6rale.
Consistent with the ascription of authority to administrative law scholarship
from France-despite the imposition of English administrative law-their
explorations of different possible constructions of "une r~gle de droit" cite
French scholars extensively.'5 6 They do not understand the constitutional
text as referring, retrospectively, to some development within the
specifically Qu6b6cois or Canadian practice of administrative law, nor as
intended, prospectively, to stimulate one. Despite differences along the
way, Gaudet and Pinard both conclude that "une r~gle de droit" in
section 1 means a norm of general application. One understandable
reason for their conclusion that "une r~gle de droit" must refer to primary
and secondary legislation, not individual decisions, is the term's
prominence in definitions of regulations. On one definition, "rbglements"
are nothing other than "r~gles de droit" the adoption of which Parliament
or the Quebec legislature has confided to other authorities. 57
To be sure, veneration for la rgle de droit does not persist
unchecked in French legal scholarship. The idea of the regle de droit
and its centrality to civilian thinking have suffered attacks. On one
recent view, the standard definition is "particuliirement critiquable,"
and a functional, rather than formal, characterization may be more
appropriate. 58 A scholar has warned provocatively against a "vritable
fdtichisation de la r~gle de Droit." 159 Contemporary practices of
governance have changed. The diversity of modes of governance-what
Quebec scholar Pierre Issalys calls the "explosion of legal forms of
public action" 6-Seems to indicate the inadequacy of a unitary
's- Pinard, supra note 32 at 101 [footnote omitted]. [Trans.] "an accepted and relatively
precise meaning. It means an abstract norm of general application." She follows a standard
definition, declaring "une r~gle de droit" to be obligatory, general, permanent, and coercive. See
e.g. Henri & Lon Mazeaud, Jean Mazeaud & Franqois Chabas, Legons de droit civil. Introduction
Sl'dtude du droi4 12th ed. by Frangois Chabas, t. 1, vol. 1 (Paris: Montchrestien, 2000) at paras. 3-4.

'5 6 Pinard, ibid.at 100-105; Gaudet, supra note 40 at 455-64.
157 Pierre Blache, "Pouvoir r6glementaire ou fonctions 16gislatives de l'administration" in
Barbe, ed., Droitadministratifsupra note 108, 49 at 51.
' 5 Denis Allard & St6phane Rials, eds., Dictionnairede la culturejuridique(Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 2003) s. v. "r gle de droit" at 1326-27.
'5 9 Denys de B6chillon, Ou'est-cequ'une r~gle de Droi? (Paris: Odile Jacob, 1997) at 13.
"Pierre Issalys, "Choosing among Forms of Public Action: A Question of Legitimacy" in
Pearl Eliadis, Margaret M. Hill & Michael Howlett, eds., Designing Government: From Instruments
to Governance (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005) 154 at 157.
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conception of rules.' 6' Jean Carbonnier speaks of a "d6gradation"
connected to "l'inflation du droit": law is used no longer only for the
proclamation of a general and permanent rule, but has become a means
of governance or management. 62 Indeed, the problems may attach not
just to la regle de droit,but to law more generally. Law seems no longer
able to reflect the normative reality of the state, leading to conjecture
that recourse to "outils de gouvernance" may correspond with "une
strat6gie de d6passement du droit."'6 3 Thus the general and particular
may no longer reflect, if ever they did, formal distinctions between rules
and decisions. Such lines of inquiry may serve as proxies for larger
debates on transitions from classical sovereignty to governance or
governmentality.' 64 For present purposes, what matters is not the
mutating present and future of the "r~gle de droit," but its past. Given
the term's doctrinal accretions, it was predictable that the reasoning in
Slaight,by which a requirement that rights be limited only by "une r~gle
de droit" became one that rights be limited by prescriptions flowing
from "une r~gle de droit," failed to secure the assent of jurists nourished
on French and Quebec administrative law.
By contrast, "prescribed by law," the English term' for section l's
threshold requirement, forms no part of standard definitions of
"regulation." 65 Nor, for that matter, does it have any particularly firm
prior meaning. "Law" need not connote generality in contrast to a
particularity which is not law. Bentham distinguished general laws from
particular laws, each the fruit of a "very different sort of power," in his
words, but each "law" nonetheless.1 66 Even the difficulties in translating
into English the title of Pinard's essay, "Les seules r~gles de droit qui
peuvent poser des limites aux droits et libert6s," while retaining the link

161Mockle, "Gouverner," supra note 47 at 206.
162Jean Carbonnier, Droit et passion du droit sous la Ve Rdpublique (Paris: Flammarion,
1996) at 109-10. For legal ordering distinguished from managerial direction, see Lon L. Fuller, The
Moralityof Law, rev. ed. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1969) at 207-13.
163Daniel Mockle, "L'6vincement du droit par l'invention de son double: les m6chanismes
n6o-r6glementaires en droit public" (2003) 44 C. de D. 291 at 355, 359.

1' Michel Foucault, "La gouvernementalit6" in Daniel Defert & Frangois Ewald, eds., Dits
etdcrits,vol. 3 (Paris: Gallimard, 1994) 635.
"On definitional difficulties, see Roderick A. Macdonald, "Understanding Regulation by
Regulations" in Ivan Bernier & Andr~e Lajoie, eds., Regulations, Crown Corporations and
Administrative Tribunals(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985) 81 at 90-92.
" Jeremy Bentham, OfLaws in General,ed. H.L.A. Hart (London: Athlone Press, 1970) at 80.
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to the English constitutional text, are telling. They remind not only of
the grammatical differences between the two language versions, but also
of the fact that, since the category of "r~gles de droit" predated section
1 of the Charter, it is fair to ask which ones will count for that
provision's purposes. As the English version of section 1 essentially
introduces the notion of things "prescribed by law" into Canadian public
law, it would be nonsensical to ask "Which ones?" or to speak of "the
only ones." Within civilian doctrine, the distinction between those things
which are "r~gles de droit" and those which are not evokes relatively
certain content. It is a certain enough distinction for judges simply to
apply it. "Prescribed by law," rather differently, is a placeholder calling
for adversarial argument and judicial construction.
The categories invoked by the respective language versions of the
Charter-"r6glesde droit" and not "r~gles de droit," "prescribed by law"
and not "prescribed by law"-situate themselves differently vis-A-vis the
distinction between regulations and decisions. The French constitutional
text's categories map neatly onto the administrative dichotomy. The
English text leaves the matter more open. More important, however, is
that the doctrinal distinction between norm-making and decision-making
in French administrative law is especially well-developed. It instantiates
the general taxonomic and descriptive ambitions for administrative law
scholarship, matters going to legal culture. Differences of opinion arising
from section 1 and brought to light by Slaight and Multaniare not purely
textual and linguistic. The textual differences laid out by Part III conceal
deeper, arguably cultural differences.
V.

CONCLUSION

This article has neither sought to arbitrate among differing
critiques of Slaight and conflicting interpretations of section 1, nor
attempted to fix the relationship between administrative law and the
Charter. Frankly, a number of the scholarly accounts overlook
ambiguities in both language versions of the Charter.Though they must
be read together, "prescribed by law" and "une r~gle de droit" are each
likely more open to multiple interpretations than is often acknowledged.
The article has argued that none of the linguistic approaches observable
in Slaight and Multani satisfies the constitutional imperatives for
bilingualism. Linguistic dualism, in which a judge and his or her
jurilinguist erect parallel distinct arguments in the two official
languages, each version of reasons engaging with one language version

20071

Prescribedby Law/Une r~gle de droit

of the Charter, sidesteps the challenge of setting different language
versions in conversation. Taking the words of one language version and
translating them afresh into the destination language, without regard for
the official text in that language, effaces a version constitutionally
granted equal authority. It appears that there are sound reasons for
doubting the assumption that Canadians enjoy a unified bilingual
constitutional order.
The article has also proposed that it is worth re-reading
Multani-in either language, or both at once! 6'-against a cultural
backdrop. In the case of some Quebec administrative law scholars,
lawyers, and judges, this backdrop includes an instinct to refer to
scholarship produced in France. To the extent that there is a legal culture
of Quebec administrative law practiced in French, it probably results from
intricately linked and mutually reinforcing influences: the civil law, the
French language, and ideas deriving from France. The threshold
requirement in section 1 of the Charterengages not only methodological
inclinations-the preference for firm ex ante definitional distinctionsbut also substantive ideas of "une r~gle de droit" as a fundamental
concept of French legal order. It is not plain on the face of the text that
the division between things that are and are not "prescribed by law"
would mirror the division between things that are and are not "r~gles de
droit." What, then, of the assumption that a cultural uniformity prevails in
Canadian public law?168
Canadian jurists increasingly accept the imperative of
harmonizing federal law with the common law and the civil law.
Admittedly, the literature reveals divergent understandings as to
whether the duty lies chiefly with Parliament to harmonize with
provincial law,'69 or whether harmonization is a two-way process

"6On reading both texts together, to avoid reading one and then interpreting the other
under the sway of the first, see Nicholas Kasirer, "What Is Vie commune? Qu'est-ce que living
together?" in Mdlanges offerts par ses collegues de McGill i Paul-Andr6 Crdpeau (Cowansville,
Qc.: Yvon Blais, 1997) 487 at 531-32.
'a For the prediction that reading the two language versions of the Chartertogether would
require reconciling not only two language versions, but also two philosphies of law, transforming
Canadian courts into "d'importantes 6coles de droit compar6," see R. Michael Beaupr6, "Vers
l'interpr6tation d'une constitution bilingue" (1984) 25 C. de D. 939 at 958.

' Jean-Maurice Brisson & Andr6 Morel, "Droit f~d~ral et droit civil: complkmentarit6,
dissociation" (1996) 75 Can. Bar Rev. 297 at 307-10, 333-34.
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entailing duties for both Parliament and provincial legislatures, 7 ° or
even whether federal, civil, and common law exhaust the relevant
" ' Perhaps this article contributes two observations to ongoing
sources.17
debates. One is that the identification of civilian, and specifically
French, influences within public law scholarship unsettles
harmonization's understanding that it is a private-law undertaking and
that public law, uniformly derived from British law, lies outside its
purview. The French language, French scholarship, and the civil law
172
may influence public law absent any express constitutional warrant.
While it is possible here only to gesture towards a rich avenue for future
research, well-developed ideas of private law within the civilian tradition
scholars apply to the
might influence the approach that some Quebec
73
powers.
legislative
of
constitutional distribution
The other observation concerns harmonization's typical assumption
that the respective characters of the civil law and the common law are
historically constant. For example, scholars may assume that while a new
civil code may alter rules and vocabulary, Quebec law is always equally
civilian. The extent to which a distinctly French influence on Quebec
administrative law has intensified in recent decades, rather than subsisting
uniformly since colonial days, invites more acute historical sensitivity and
alertness to internal cultural currents. To complement the sensitive
phenomenological observation that the other language and the other
tradition haunt the reading of bilingual and bijural legal texts, 74 this article
would underscore that the experience may occur in public law matters and
that the intensity of the echo of the other varies temporally and qualitatively.
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Roderick A. Macdonald, "Harmonizing the Concepts and Vocabulary of Federal and

Provincial Law: The Unique Situation of Quebec Civil Law" in Department of Justice Canada, The
Harmonizationof FederalLegislation with Quebec Civil Law and CanadianBijuralism: Collection
of Studies (1999) 27 at paras. 23-3 1.
Robert Leckey, "Harmonizing Family Law's Identities" (2002) 28 Queen's L.J. 221 at 257-63.
For detection of the influence of civilian general principles of law in constitutional
reasoning, see Jean-Frangois Gaudreault-DesBiens, "Underlying Principles and the Migration of
Reasoning Templates: A Trans-Systemic Reading of the Quebec Secession Reference' in Sujit
Choudhry, ed., The Migration of ConstitutionalIdeas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2006) 178 [Choudhry, ed., Migration].
'n

172

17" For hints in this direction, see Jean Leclair, "L'impact de la nature d'une competence
16gislative sur l'6tendue du pouvoir confr6 dans le cadre de la Loi.constitutionnelle de 1867" (1994)
28 R.J.T. 661; Jean Leclair, "L'interaction entre le droit priv6 f~d~ral et le droit civil qu~becois en
mati~re d'effets de commerce: perspective constitutionnelle" (1995) 40 McGill L.J. 691.

4
" Kasirer, "L'outre-loi," supranote 73 at 349-51.
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Whatever harmonization's character and scope, it contemplates
differential interpretation of federal laws from one province to another.
Tolerance for the idea that the Charteritself-not a federal statute but
an enactment of the imperial Parliament 7 5-might be interpreted
differentially across the federation is rather lesser, though it is not
difficult to imagine why it might. If, in a neglected way, private law
developments influence the Charteis interpretation, 76 why would not
those influences vary province to province? Even on entirely public law
questions, might not their experience interpreting Quebec's Charterof
Human Rights and Freedoms incline Quebec judges to construe the
Canadian Charter differently than do their counterparts elsewhere?
Perhaps the one idea eliminable up front is that the language versions of
the Charterwould apply separately on territory designated by political
boundaries-the version frangaise in Quebec, the English version
elsewhere (and, on this discredited approach, both in Manitoba and
New Brunswick?). Yet rejecting that error in favour of reading both
language versions together does not preclude patterns of local diversity
less easily mapped. It leaves intact the likelihood that a reader of both
versions in some places might understand the Charterdifferently than
do readers of both versions elsewhere. Practitioners of administrative
law in Quebec City might broach a problem differently than would their
counterparts in Montreal. Indeed, it is precisely this article's point that
the unruly couplet "prescribed by law"/"une r~gle de droit" resonates
differently for some Canadian administrative law scholars, advocates,
and judges than it does for others. Perhaps it is appropriate for the
Supreme Court of Canada to assure a measure of uniformity in the
Charteis interpretation across the federation. Such an aspiration
represents a choice over more locally contingent alternatives. Moreover,
it would be unsatisfactory to achieve this uniformity by privileging one
language version over the other. The most respectful form of legal
argument attempts to persuade readers of both versions of the norms
towards which the two versions gesture together.
75
" As the federal InterpretationAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-21, does not direct interpretation of
the Charter, it is academic to wonder whether the couplet "prescribed by law"/"une r~gle de droit"
might be said to have "a different meaning in the civil law and the common law," such that if the act
applied, it would be appropriate to adopt the civil law's meaning in the Province of Quebec and the
common law's meaning in other provinces.
176 Robert Leckey, "Private Law as Constitutional Context for Same-Sex Marriage" (2007)

2 J.C.L. 172.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 45, NO. 3

This cursory attempt to elucidate an internal legal culture of the
droit administratifqudbdcois should not imply a cultural neutrality on
the part of those labouring in the English-language trenches, or suggest
the identity of practice in the common law provinces with English
administrative law. More importantly, neither should it be read as
depicting an internal unity within the practice and scholarship of the
droit administratifqu6bdcois. For example, the Quebec administrative
law academy does not reveal a total refusal to rethink the way that
instruments not traditionally characterized as "r~gles de droit" limit
rights.177 What distinguishes the more creative work along these lines
emanating from Quebec from criticisms of Slaight and Little Sisters
published in English is the explicit awareness of the resistance with
which willingness to question "l'orthodoxie positiviste" must contend.'78
While the English-language threshold requirement "prescribed by law"
permits of expansion, it is wise to anticipate sterner resistance on formal
grounds from readers of l'articlepremierto expanding the idea of law.
Not all Quebec jurists pleading, adjudicating, or commenting on
administrative law evince what Pierre Legrand would call une mentalit6
frangaise.Some speculate that the richness of the community of Quebec
administrative law scholars reflects even biographical differences, such as
the venue of graduate education. Perhaps a Quebec public law professor
with a D.Phil. from Oxford approaches administrative law differently than
does a Paris-educated docteur en droit. More interesting yet, what of
those with degrees from both places, who resist proclaiming fealty to a
single tradition or culture? The complexities of Canadian legal history
and practice show diverse tendencies and rich cross-overs. 179 Given how
many Quebec jurists navigate different languages, genres, and cultures
with aplomb, it is reassuring that, on at least one view, a study of culture
need not deny their cosmopolitanism to those studied. 8 ° Multiple
identities are richly evident in Canadian law. If jurilinguists are aptly
regarded as "constitutedby middleness," linked to their experience "living

" Mockle, "Gouverner," supranote 47 at 211, 204-205, 209.
178Ibid. at

205.

Indeed, Garneau, supra note 133 at 147, connects "la sp6cificit6 qu6b6coise,"
manifested through "la predominance de I'amalgame," with "la diversit6 culturelle qui caract6rise
lacommunaut6 juridique Atous les niveaux."
8
°Legrand, "Authenticity," supra note 94 at 390.
'79
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with different traditions and different languages, ' so too are many
judges and other participants in Canadian legal order. Some Quebec
administrative lawyers refer routinely to materials from France and show
themselves influenced by them. Some do not. Yet the diversity is
distributed unevenly across the federation. It would be difficult to identify
a Canadian administrative lawyer working in English outside Quebec who
turns instinctively to the droitadministratifofFrance.'
Methodologically, this article has restricted its gaze to formal
texts, the literary deposits in which legal ideas find written expression.
Reflecting conventional lawyerly preoccupations, it has not attempted to
connect textual representations of norms and cultural tendencies to
deeper influences that a sociological, psychological, or political inquiry
might unearth. Even in the article's excavations within the law library,
however, a lesson for comparatists may be discernible. After all, it has
sought to uncover cultural reflexes, such as the citation of French
doctrine, that are immune to direct regulation. A perceived connection
between Quebec administrative law and French administrative law
persists, and indeed has recently intensified, in unabashed defiance of
imperial fiat imposing English public law. This article underscores
"'unofficial' vehicles of transfer," such as law books, as a promising object
for further comparative research.'8 3 While the Conseil d'Ettat is rightly
proud of French administrative law's global influence,' 84 a methodological
shift towards less explicit, and less authorized, invocation of French ideas
might reveal influence more pervasive still. Comparative constitutionalists
are commendably turning their attention to the "migration of constitutional
ideas across legal systems."' 85 Perhaps this article emphasizes the value of
defining such inquiries beyond officially recognized sources of law such as
8 Nicholas Kasirer, "Is the Canadian Jurilinguist-Living entre langues et droits-a
Middle Power?" in G~mar & Kasirer, supra note 69, 579 at 582. See also, on the possibility of a
person's having a plural legal identity and culture, Daniel Jutras, "Etnoncer l'indicible: le droit entre
langues et traditions" [2000] R.I.D.C. 781 at 791.
182The asymmetry of Canadian bijuralism is underscored by Jean-Franqois GaudreaultDesBiens, Les solitudes du biuridisme au Canada:Essai sur les rapports de pouvoir entre les
traditionsjuridiqueset )a rsiliencedes atavismes identitaires(Montreal: Th6mis, 2007) at 146-48.
' G. Blaine Baker, "The Reconstitution of Upper Canadian Legal Thought in the LateVictorian Empire" (1985) 3 L. & Hist. Rev. 219 at 220.
4Conseil d'Etat, L'influence internationaledu droit frangais (Paris: La documentation
franqaise, 2001) at 54-57.
'Sujit Choudhry, "Migration as a New Metaphor in Comparative Constitutional Law" in
Choudhry, ed., Migration,supra note 172, 1 at 13.
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written constitutions and the judgments of constitutional courts. While
periodically they hint at isolation, scholars' footnotes also reveal currents
of unofficial normative migration.
It is ironic that Multani--popularly understood as concerning
cultural differences, whatever law's proper response to them-must
itself be read with cultural sensitivity. If, as has been suggested
poetically, translation may "require the creation of a whole new idea of
law, a culture in the space between cultures, resulting less in a
'translation' from English to French than in the invention of a new
' so, surely, may interpretation of
language, a new world," 186
a bilingual
(and, to an unrecognized degree, bijural) constitution. Impossible as it
may be to specify and secure the conditions to guarantee this
aspiration's attainment, failure to consider the cultural specificity of
Quebec public law likely impedes such world-making.

186White, supra note 87 at 244.

